The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XV | New York, Saturday, July 13, 1918 | Number 193

Contents

Editorial Notes 300
Leading Editorials
- Reconstituting the Eastern Front 302
- Industrial Citizenship for Women 304
- The Failure of Bureaucracy 305
- The Imponderable in Labor Politics 307

General Articles
- The Alliance and the League ..... H. N. Brailsford 309
- The Secret of the German Successes .... H. Sidebotham 311
- What Japan is Thinking ..... G. Shibata 313
- Verse 315
- The Education of Joan and Peter—II .... H. G. Wells 316

Correspondence 319
Books and Things ..... P. L. 321
Reviews of Books
- Purple Cows ..... F. H. 322
- What is History? ..... H. J. L. 323
- Sharing the Surplus ..... O. T. 324

Recent Publications 325

WASHINGTON despatches exhibit confidence that America's Russian policy is to be modified in the direction said to be desired by the governments of the Allies. This may be forecast or it may be propaganda: we are coming to adjust our constitutions to an inextricable mixture of the two. So much is probable: the American government must find itself in an increasingly difficult position in maintaining a view of the Russian situation differing markedly from that of the nations with which we are cooperating. This is not a case in which America is standing for international interests against particularistic ambitions. The other nations in league against Germany as well as America are desirous of Russia's best good. America is as desirous as any of the Allies for the aid Russia might bring to the common cause. The question is one of judgment. There are risks in the policy of immediate military intervention. There are also risks in the policy of waiting until by civil commissions and economic aid we have stilled Russian suspicions of our motives. The latter seems to most Americans the greater risk, but shall the judgment of one country stand against that of all the rest?

IF in the past the diplomacy of the Allies had proved impeccable America would feel more confidence in their plan of intervention in Russia. But all the world knows now that Allied diplomacy disastrously misread the Balkan situation. By granting to Serbia, Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria nothing more than national claims that the democratic instincts of mankind would validate, the Balkan union could have been reconstituted on the Allied side. Turkey would have been dismembered, Austria-Hungary would have fallen to pieces long before this time. The Allied governments placed the aspirations of the great nations above the rights of lesser peoples. Venizelos, with his offer of Balkan resources adequate to the taking of Constantinople and the immobilization of Hungary, looked small to the chancelleries. Liberal opinion in England was all in favor of satisfying the aspirations of the Balkan nations and winning them to the war: but should liberal England stand out against the majority of the Allies? If she had done so the war would have been won. Today the condition may be repeating itself. Liberal America is opposed to a form of intervention that may easily degenerate into a war of conquest of Russian soil. Liberal and labor opinion in England and France is also opposed to it. We are not pitting our opinion against that of the world, but against that of the traditional minded diplomats who botch every transaction in which democratic forces are to be conciliated.

THERE is a grim humor in the changing attitude of the interventionist press toward Kerenski. While he was in hiding in Russia, with a price (in depreciated rubles) on his head, he was a saint. His escape to England excited immense interest: now at last the anti-interventionists were to be confounded by one who could speak with au-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thority on the yearning of the real Russian people for a big armed force. It was true, Kerenski's antagonism to the existing régime and his confidence in the possibility of overthrowing it might be colored somewhat by his own bitter experience: but no one could possibly doubt Kerenski's honesty, his devotion to the Allies and his patriotism. Kerenski has spoken, but little of what he says finds its way into the press. He desires Allied aid for Russia, but at Russia's request. What a bitter disappointment! And now the interventionists are beginning to recall that they never thought much of Kerenski. He was a dreamer. Why did he not support Kornilov and save Russia? Why does he now consort, not with the men of iron who would whip Russia back into the war with a whiff of grape shot, but with Branting and other Socialists who, though anti-Bolshevik, desire not only to bring Russia back into the war, but to retain the fruits of the revolution? If he is permitted to come to America, with whom will he consort? Better the Bolsheviki had got him.

VON MIRBACH'S assassination means far more in international politics than in international law. He was the accredited German representative in Moscow, but his diplomatic functions were purely incidental. His chief function was the cataloguing and organization of Russian resources that might be useful to Germany. As soon as the truce between the Russian and the German commanders was signed, von Mirbach set out for the Russian capital with a whole host of secretaries, engineers, economic experts, to prepare for the immediate exploitation of Russia. When the Brest-Litovsk negotiations were broken off he retired behind the German lines, only to return after the so-called peace with enlarged personnel and extended schemes. Up to the time of his assassination he was busily engaged in perfecting an organization designed to corner Russian supplies of essentials, to plan out the course of punitive expeditions that might later prove politically necessary, to plant provocateurs, to sow suspicion and cultivate anarchy. Von Mirbach was Germany's master spider. His assassination is a great loss to Germany: there are few of his kind and his talents. His system survives, but this evidence of Russian antagonism cannot have failed to disturb its smooth workings. It remains dangerous, and we should by this time have recognized the need of maintaining on Russian soil a commission with resources adequate to the task of combating it.

AT Mount Vernon, on the Fourth, President Wilson did not attempt to make a detailed application of the principles for which we stand shoulder to shoulder with our Allies. His aim was to make a concise statement of the war aims for which all the major Allies are now fighting and will continue to fight. His aim was to impress upon all hearers and readers of his speech the far-reaching importance and also the definiteness of those simple and fundamental principles upon which Great Britain, France and the United States are agreed. How well he succeeded is shown by what Mr. Lloyd George said the next day: "If the Kaiser and his advisers will accept the conditions voiced by the President they can have peace with America, peace with France, peace with Great Britain, tomorrow." A closer union of minds and wills, French, British and American, exists today than at any other time since we entered the war.

MAJOR MITCHEL gave his life for his country's cause. Had he been killed in action over the western front he could not have given more. In the past week thousands have said this, and now as in all like cases it is literally true. Yet the truth of it cannot keep Major Mitchel's friends from regretting, as the friends of the other brave men killed by accident or drowned at sea have regretted, that the dead did not live long enough to go into battle. Remembering how passionately he longed to fight, how eagerly he looked forward to doing his part against the enemy, his friends feel not only that they have lost a friend, but that a soldier has died before his deepest wish was granted.

IT would be a gross exaggeration to say that Major Mitchel would have been reelected Mayor of New York if Mr. Hearst's reputation had been last autumn what it is today. Many forces besides Mr. Hearst's ability as a misrepresenter and calumniator contributed to Major Mitchel's defeat. Nor is it certain that Mr. Hearst's influence has as yet waned sufficiently for a majority of his readers to estimate his methods at their true value. Attention is just now concentrated upon his attitude toward the war. But the rest of him also deserves attention. On whatever side you find him you find his methods unfair. Now and then he tells the truth, but he does not tell it when he thinks something else will better serve his purposes. In American journalism he is the most important and most successful poisoner of the wells. The more widely this fact is believed the better.

BECAUSE the firemen and coal passers on an Atlantic transport have held out for the war zone bonus, the New York Times circulates the word of "shipping officials" that (1) this is entirely due to the La Follette Seamen's Bill and (2) that it is part of German propaganda. "Shipping officials said yesterday that the whole trouble with the crews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of merchant ships chartered by the Government was due to the La Follette Seamen's Bill which allowed the crew to sign articles and desert the ship five minutes before sailing. In many instances steamships loaded with cargoes badly needed by the Allies had been delayed and missed the convoy through the extortionate demands of the firemen and sailors. Agitators persuaded the men to quit, and it was the opinion of the shipping officials and Consular officers that this was a part of the German propaganda." With the "extortionate demands" of firemen and sailors the Government is competent to deal, but there remains this allegation of a pro-German plot to induce firemen and coal passers to hold up transports. Has the New York Times any serious belief in this alleged plot? Has it any more reason to believe it than we have reason to believe that the New York Times is engaged by Germany to circulate unsupported rumors in order to undermine American labor's loyalty to the cause of the Allies?

WHATEVER doubt there may be as to the legal case against Dr. Rumely, the moral case against him is clear. In accepting money from the German government to finance an American newspaper he was committing himself to the interests of an alien government, and at a time when those interests were very likely to come into conflict with those of his own country. It may be urged that at the time when Rumely accepted German money we were not in the war and Germany had as good a legal right to carry on a propaganda here as any other country. She had indeed a right to carry on a propaganda frankly and openly: in morals, at least, she had no right whatever to practice secretly upon American public opinion. It was crooked work: not even the morally myopic could fail to see this. It was not in violation of the law, but this was by defect of law. At the earliest possible moment Congress ought to enact a law defining and penalizing the offense of accepting money from foreign governments for the purpose of influencing American opinion through the public press. It may be that propaganda abroad is in future to be a recognized function of governments, but it must be propaganda which bears the stamp of its origin on its face.

THE New York Nation has severed its connection with the New York Evening Post. It becomes an independent and self-contained editorial organization, selecting material and moulding policy according to its own purposes. This is a welcome development in the enriching and diversifying of opinion. In the daily journalism of the United States no editorial page has a more honorable or better sustained reputation than the New York Evening Post, but only the exceptional demands of a compact situation or a definite personality could call for the reprinting of daily editorials and the corresponding forfeit of the facilities afforded by a longer approach. In undertaking to make the Nation a self-determined weekly Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard will undoubtedly impart new color and tone to his eminent publication. There is not only room for this in the country, the country needs few intellectual services more. The intensive cultivation of opinion is an old story with the Nation. It is still a new story with America, and the Nation has given itself a fresh opportunity to enhance its fine tradition.

Reconstituting the Eastern Front

ON one point those who oppose and those who favor armed intervention in Russia can agree. Russia is still at war with Germany. The peace of Brest-Litovsk is only a provisional peace, in effect nothing more than a truce between the military party of Germany, temporarily dictating the policy of the German nation, and a Russian revolutionary committee whose authority is neither derived, as that of the Lvov and Kerenski governments were, by any recognized principle of devolution, nor validated by plebiscite or vote of constituent representatives. The Russian peace was a compact of two dictatorships. But the majority forces of the world mean to go behind dictatorships and all their works to the real will of the peoples. The Russian armistice may possibly stand as long as the German lines hold in France. That is all that Germany has actually achieved on the east. She is enlarged according to her cartographers, but the maintenance of her extended frontiers involves a ceaseless outpouring of her best blood.

But no patriotic Russian expects, and no friend of Russia desires, the armistice to last until the Germans are beaten into submission on the west. If Russia is really to profit by the revision of the Brest-Litovsk treaties, she must resume her obligation to aid the other free nations in breaking the power of Germany. Otherwise, though Germany might be compelled by the western Allies to abjure aggrandizement at Russian expense, this would be hardly more than a formality. An inert people is the natural prey of the strongest aggressive neighbor. Russia can not safely permit herself passively to be restored to her own. This is instinctively recognized by great numbers of Rus-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sians. The incessant local revolts against German and Austrian authority in the Ukraine, the anti-German movement in Great Russia, which has culminated in the audacious stroke of the assassins of Mirbach, prove sufficiently that Russia has not succumbed in spirit to peace with subjection. Russia can be brought back into the war if Allied diplomacy is sufficiently farsighted to lend all its efforts to re-establish in the Russian mind the confidence shaken by secret treaties and the apparent coquetting with counter-revolutionary intrigue.

Fortunately for the Allied cause, the Germans have already made all the diplomatic mistakes that even a government of generals and Junkers can make. They have consistently backed the weaker party in Finland, the Baltic provinces and the Ukraine. The party of the great landowners and their satellites were ready to make any terms with Germany that would safeguard their possessions. The sympathy of the German Junker for Junkers of German or even alien blood, planted among the revolutionary border populations, together with Junker overestimation of the political potency of a landed aristocracy, determined the German choice of party alignment. The Germans are compromised with the border state aristocracies, and in Great Russia the aristocracy is a broken reed. The aristocracy is not particularly useful even in the Ukraine. According to an article by Dr. Rohrbach published in the Bremen Nachrichten and translated by the Times, "everyone in the Ukraine, without distinction of political belief, knows and admits that with the withdrawal of the German troops bloody Bolshevism and anarchy will break out over the Ukraine." All the subtle play of Germany upon Ukrainian nationalism goes for naught. The Ukrainian state has its Hetman, Skoropadski, Ukrainian in blood and temperament, but as one might have anticipated, he is the possessor of latifundia of 250,000 acres or more. Skoropadski is one of the men whom the majority sentiment of the Ukraine would dispossess.

Here then is a situation potentially favorable to the Allies. They have a broad base of resentment against Germany to build upon. That resentment is partly nationalistic, partly social. The Germans are detestable as a people greedy for land and as a people who are likely to restore the ancient order of landed aristocrats and servile peasants. Anti-German sentiment is of course not the same thing as sentiment for the Allies, but they can be made the same thing by skilful Allied diplomacy. The Allies want no Russian territory. They do not want to interfere in domestic Russian politics. But they have to convince the average Russian of this. And this problem is rendered the more difficult because the Russians are well aware that in every Allied country are to be found seductive propagandists for intervention whose real motive is counter-revolutionary.

Mere proclamations will not do the work of winning Russian confidence. The Czecho-Slovaks under arms in Russia proclaimed their neutrality with respect to local politics, but where they have seized control, as in Samara, the anti-Soviet forces have taken the opportunity to wreak vengeance on their opponents. What guarantee can we give Russia that this proceeding would not be repeated on a large scale if we sent an army into Siberia? Our bond, to be sure, but we have first to establish its currency in Russian opinion. And this involves still an immense deal of preliminary work. We have open to us the Soviet invitation to aid in the work of economic rehabilitation. It is an opportunity for establishing an understanding. Our motives are honest. Why then do we delay in making the effort prerequisite to conveying our purposes to the Russian people?

Because, it will be said, the condition is urgent. It is a long road, by way of economic commissions, and the establishment of an understanding, to the reconstitution of the eastern front. It is indeed, and everyone in the Allied world desires the earliest possible reconstitution of the eastern front. But it matters immensely where that front is reconstituted, whether on a line west of Petrograd or on a line east of Lake Baikal. If we could bring Russia back into the fight on the former line, we should have won the war. If we forced her into the fight on the latter line we should have all but lost the war.

And after all the delay of a cautious policy may not be great. A German punitive expedition to Petrograd and Moscow on account of the Mirbach assassination may easily rouse the Russians to resistance. And when the Russians themselves are leading an attack upon Germany, Allied military aid will no longer be suspect. The Germans may content themselves with apologies for Mirbach, but sooner or later, probably sooner, they will be driven to acts of aggression, and the Russian people will resist. Then the conditions will be fulfilled which Kerenski and the democratic anti-Bolshevik party regard as prerequisite to Allied military aid. "The appearance of Allied troops on Russian territory can only be accepted for strategic reasons connected with the struggle against Germany, a struggle which must be carried on by Russian forces and on condition that such action is carried on by the Allies in common." Such was the opinion of the Russian Constituent Assembly in May; it is still the best Russian opinion. If we work within its limits we may yet gain inestimable advantages

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from Russian cooperation. If we permit ourselves to be carried away by zeal for thrusting Russia into the war by sheer force, we may lose her altogether and take upon ourselves the burden of a war indefinitely prolonged.

Industrial Citizenship for Women

THE appointment of Miss Mary Van Kleeck as a member of the National War Labor Policies Board is, we believe, the first instance during the war in which the government has recognized the civic as distinguished from the purely sex interest of women in the conduct of public affairs. The plan of the War Labor Policies Board as originally published some five months ago contemplated the creation of a woman's division under the jurisdiction of the Board; but it was not then proposed to make the chief of this division a full-fledged member of the Board itself. She was to sit in with the board only when questions involving the special interests of women were under consideration. As in the case of the Woman's Committee of the United States Council of National Defense, and in innumerable less conspicuous cases, an invidious distinction was to have been made between women and men; women were to have been recognized on grounds of pseudo-chivalry rather than on fundamentally democratic grounds of coequal citizenship. Miss Van Kleeck's appointment marks what we hope will prove a permanent break on the part of the government with the moribund feudal tradition that still holds sway in the United States Senate and still debars millions of American women from the political franchise. It is reported that Miss Van Kleeck herself in accepting her appointment insisted upon the recognition of the full industrial citizenship of wage-working women.

This aspect of Miss Van Kleeck's appointment recalls an interesting episode of the recent convention of the American Federation of Labor in St. Paul. Because of the rapid influx of women into the war industries and the difficulties of organizing them not only for their self-protection but also for the protection of the standards which the men's unions have been at such pains to establish, a group of women moved to have the constitution of the A. F. of L. so amended as to make the election of at least two women to the Federation's Executive Council mandatory. No doubt one of their reasons for taking this action was the fact that the traditional attitude of the leaders of the A. F. of L. toward women has not been unlike that of the United States Senate. Interestingly enough, however, the strongest opposition to their proposal came from another group of women trade unionists. Miss Friedman, representing the Waist and Dress Makers, the largest organization of women in the American trade union movement, vigorously opposed the election of women as women, arguing that such action would violate the essential principle of democracy and militate against the best interests of women as citizens. The motion was overwhelmingly defeated.

Miss Van Kleeck's position, like Miss Friedman's, seems to us thoroughly sound. It is of the utmost importance to the health of our community as well as of our industrial life that women should enter industry on their merits as workers and not merely as women. Unless the women themselves can be persuaded to take this point of view, they will inevitably be made the victims of all manner of patrioteering and in the process of their exploitation, they will be instrumental in wrecking the standards which men have won, in breaking down the morale of men with whom they come into competition, in retarding war production and jeopardizing the economic security of family life. These things have already happened in certain of our most important war manufacturing centres. The machinists of Philadelphia, for instance, are reported to have taken a defiant stand against the introduction of women into all plants in which their organized influence counts. They contend that certain employers have unduly anticipated a shortage of skilled labor and have resorted to the indiscriminate recruiting of women not from motives of patriotism but with a view to undermining the men's standards.

Increasingly as the war goes on women will have to replace men at the machines. What the women of England, France and Italy have done, American women will do also. But what Miss Van Kleeck appears to insist upon is that such governmental agencies as the War Labor Policies Board must concern themselves not merely with the protection of the health and morals of women as women, but with the protection of the industrial standards upon which the economic security of the working masses depends and in which women as citizens have a common interest with men. She has wisely insisted that no invidious distinctions should be made between woman power and man power and that the interests of women must be merged in the general interests of the entire producing group. In other words, she regards the problems of women in industry not primarily as sex problems, but as industrial problems.

If the War Labor Policies Board develops this position into a controlling national policy, war production will be spared endless unnecessary interruptions. If the machinists, for instance, could be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assured that the introduction of women is not to be made a war substitute for the former indiscriminate introduction of foreign laborers whose immigration has been stopped by the war, their attitude of opposition would undoubtedly change to an attitude of genuinely patriotic cooperation. If they could be assured that women would be used to replace men only in cases where men were actually not available, that the women would be paid the standard union wage, and would be carefully selected and trained for the efficient performance of their work, they would undoubtedly offer their help in teaching the newcomers and would cooperate in the considered introduction of women. Their present opposition is inspired by their fear of patrioteering to which women have shown themselves peculiarly susceptible.

Fortunately, Miss Van Kleeck's position is not based exclusively or even primarily upon idealistic considerations. For many months she has been director of the Women's Branch of the Industrial Service Section of the Army Ordnance Bureau. She has been required to cooperate with the commanding officers of government arsenals in the practical solution of problems arising out of the introduction of women into these vast government factories. She and her assistants have been called into similar cooperation by private concerns engaged upon munitions contracts. In these plants, they have succeeded in averting many of the difficulties that have retarded production in shops where women were indiscriminately hired and employed without expert supervision. By their consistent common sense and practical ability they have gradually dispelled the formerly pervasive prejudice against women as technical shop advisers. They have won the confidence of the workers and the respect of the employers. That they have proved their value to the government seems conclusively demonstrated not only by Miss Van Kleeck's appointment to the War Labor Policies Board, but especially by the Board's recognition of her not merely as the representative of women as women but of women as industrial citizens with rights and responsibilities co-equal with the responsibilities and rights of men.

The Failure of Bureaucracy

AFTER a trip to America to study "Democracy at home," Alexis de Tocqueville, the French economist, observed as early as 1831 that "Many people in Europe are apt to believe without saying it or to say without believing it, how one of the great advantages of democracy is that it entrusts the direction of public affairs to men who are most fit to wield the supreme authority. I confess that the observations I made in America by no means coincide with these opinions. On my arrival in the United States I was surprised to find so much distinguished talent among the subjects and so little among the governmental heads. . . When, however, a state is threatened by serious dangers the people frequently succeed in selecting citizens who are the most able to save it, and genius no longer abstains from presenting itself in the arena."

Considered in the light of these remarks certain phenomena of the war situation today take on a more familiar appearance, principally the reason for the failure of the old-line government departments to prove equal to the present emergencies, necessitating the establishment of the new organizations with which Washington is alive. This failure of departmentalism can be traced to the door of departmentalism itself. The fault is inherent and so built into the foundations of the system that the elimination of it cannot be effected without the destruction of what, even with its defects, is an essentially democratic institution. In order, therefore, to care for the new conditions the only alternative has been taken and the ordinary course of administration temporarily sidetracked.

Even the casual visitor to Washington is impressed with the difference between the organizations of the pre-war government and the emergency bodies which are today the mainspring, gears and balance wheel of that comparatively smooth-running mechanism, which in spite of the complications introduced by three million square miles of territory and one hundred and ten million different individualities, runs on idealism. The casual visitor is usually willing to admit that "something is wrong with Bureaucracy" but is also usually satisfied that he has disposed of the question by the mere admission that there is a condition that should not exist. It is barely possible that he considers this condition as a condition of individuals. It is. Individuals, however, without individuality, with progressivness and initiative bred out of them by a selective process that is a graphic demonstration of evolution reversed. For as in business, where initiative is essential for success, just so in bureaucracy is the exact reverse the case. Initiative involves a willingness to venture, to take a risk, in order to secure a desired end. An element of mistake is, therefore, possible. In bureaucracy a mistake, that is, one of policy, is fatal to a career. This arrangement artificially places a premium upon the lack of initiative, so that to retain his post, the government employee must either be congenitally devoid of that quality or stifle it to its ultimate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disappearance from desuetude. Hence, it follows that with promotion based on seniority, the man in the highest post is the man with no mistakes to his record and, as a likely corollary, no achievements either, nor, in the natural course of things, a possibility of any. An examination of the heads of these bureaus and the thousands of clerks who grow gray in the game of official battledore and shuttlecock will reveal a distinct type. To illustrate, let us assume that one hundred men start in the service of the government and another hundred of similar ability begin simultaneously with one of our great and efficiently organized commercial enterprises. The one hundred government employees will start work at about $1200 a year and in the course of time, if they remain long enough and live long enough, each will equally reach the limit of promotion and remuneration at the head of his bureau and approximately $5000 annually. The one hundred who serve commerce will be winnowed the first year. They will be paid not according to civil service rating or seniority, but by ability, and advanced by the same rule. A large percentage of them will go into the discard, but approximately five of them will comparatively soon, by superior ability or alternatively by what in business parlance is "hustle," attain success and commensurate salaries.

The first fault with the bureaucrat, therefore, is the fault of his employer, the government, for the government employee be he the humblest clerk or the highest bureau head is relatively poorly paid. This is particularly true in the more exalted positions where the compensation should be such as to at least satisfy if not attract the best brains in any given field. And while it is true that in some bureaus the men in charge are the best available, in each case it is more of an accident of circumstance than the logical outgrowth of proper conditions, and in each case also a very considerable pecuniary sacrifice attends the men who hear the very still small voice of patriotic service and turn a deaf ear to the loud and attractive offers of commercialism. The parsimony of the government toward its officers has engendered a supposition of far more economical propensities than really exist. For the present, while enormous sums are needed for the war, this need not be heard, but in the reconstructive period to come, it may be well to consider whether a more economical employment of the funds of the government can be had than through a policy which will allow an attractive subsistence to the individuals who conduct its affairs.

The bureaucrat is poorly paid. His next raise depends upon his term of service or the providential death or promotion of one of his superiors. Lacking the competitive impulse which energizes the business world, his initiative atrophied, he becomes the slave of his job. He does just as much as is expected of him and no more. His vision eventually becomes so circumscribed that he cannot, figuratively, lift his eyes above the level of his own desk-top. He finds that there is safety from extra effort in strict adherence to every reactionary dogma, and styles any attempt to modernize his methods as "dangerous radicalism." He knows too that he will have plenty of support from all the other departmentalists whenever the attacks of this "radicalism" become so frequent and annoying that it has to be gassed. He finally and thoroughly degenerates to the point where his one aim in life is the disposal of papers. Every document received is read, not with a view to its reply, but solely to determine to what drawer it may be permanently consigned or to whom it may be referred. The Washington mail-sacks are distended daily with thousands of letters "Respectfully referred" and "For your consideration and action" which letters, covered with departmental time-stamps, after many days not infrequently make their circuitous way back to the very department where they were first opened. An accurate acquaintance with those thirty-five pages of the Congressional Directory devoted to the Executive departments which would enable a man rapidly to refer any letter to *someone else* to handle would make him an envied and invaluable acquisition for any old-line department.

Is it any wonder, therefore, that with such a foundation, the departmental structure, which in normal times makes a very passable showing, has neared collapse under each successive war burden since April, 1917? The first expedient was tried in the spring and summer of last year when in the effort to make the departments bear the new load, they were shored up with the timbers of the Council of Defense. This construction, however, proved both awkward and unsound, and though sentiment for a while forefended, the administration has realized and acted upon the wisdom of calling on the business Hercules to sustain the heavens for the period of the war. It is a fine arrangement. Hercules will have a more wholesome respect for the very considerable task which the departmental Atlas will again assume when the war is over, and Atlas, temporarily relieved of his burden, has a chance to observe the impenetrable oak-forest of formality and red tape that has grown up about his knees and an opportunity to clear the icicles of indifference which have accumulated in his beard. Perhaps, too, he will notice that Hercules is using a lion-skin upon his shoulders to make the load less galling, and so he may be converted to the adoption of more modern methods and awakened to receptivity for new ideas.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Imponderable in Labor Politics

THE virtual repudiation by the American Federation of Labor, in its Thirty-Eighth Annual Convention, of the programme of the British Labor Party, the denunciation of its authors as theorists and politicians, and the re-affirmation of the Federation's intention to adhere to "pure and simple Trades Unionism," furnish additional evidence of the deep divergence of tendency between European and American labor, and, it is to be feared, of a grave failure on the part of many American Trades Unionists to understand the spirit, the motives, the real nature of the forces animating the new movements in Europe.

The divergence arises perhaps from the difficulty which American unionists seem to experience in giving due weight to certain non-material motives in the European movement, motives not directly related to questions of hours and wages. The charges of "theorizing" and high-browism seem to be the expression of impatience at the introduction of policies not easily defensible in terms of immediate advantage in wages and conditions. The plain implication of the St. Paul decision is that the one object of the workers is a progressive improvement of material conditions; and that if the largest immediate result in that respect is to be obtained by a form of Trades Unionism which, limiting itself strictly to piece-meal action on points of wages and hours, renounces any attempt at wider social changes, that renunciation is fully justified. The assumption is, that provided the material condition of the workers is good enough, there is no moral objection to the retention of the existing social and economic order, of the workers' position as a separate class therein and its relationship to present political and social institutions.

But the chief impulse behind the development of the last year or two in British labor politics does not come merely, or mainly, perhaps, from a desire for improvement in material conditions. That development has followed a steady rise in wages, and the promise of automatic improvement in conditions. The main motive force of the latest development, is the impulse to a real democracy—the "right of self-determination," self-government, not alone in the political, but in the industrial and social sphere; equality, not only political, but social and cultural; and, for the great mass of the people, a degree of control over the conditions of their daily lives which no mere Trades Union stipulations concerning hours and wages can give. Into the words "democracy" and "self-government" have been poured a content—in part as a by-product of the war itself—which a few years ago in England they did not have, and which the American Trades Unionist in America seems hardly to suspect.

It is, of course, fatally easy to overlook the force of a motive in others which cannot be measured or even expressed in material terms. The difficulty of giving weight to these elusive moral values is precisely what makes Irish and certain other nationalisms incomprehensible to many Englishmen —and Americans—and has so far made the Irish problem insoluble; and which, to the German, makes certain motives of his enemies incomprehensible.

Yet the war itself is inexplicable and meaningless unless we give a large place in its underlying causes to certain moral imponderabilia: the struggle of Serbians for nationality, of Belgians for the respect of their independence, things we cannot evaluate merely in economic terms. And the curious thing is that the reality of a motive which he will admit in the case of a Belgian or unsophisticated Serbian, the American Trades Unionist of the older school boggles at in the case of English working men with a thousand years of bitter social and political struggle behind them. The average American would repel with indignation the plea that Belgian resistance was "high-brow" or "high-falutin'," or based on foolish dreams and "theories," because, once settled down under German rule, Belgium would be as well administered as under King Albert; that wages would be as high as in Germany; that the workers would benefit by all the German labor legislation and Brussels be as clean and well kept as Munich. As little would a New Yorker—even an anti-Tammanyite—listen to the argument that New York would be better governed by one of the famous trained professional mayors from Germany than by Judge Hylan. In such cases we recognize readily enough that good government can never be a substitute for self-government, nor efficiency for democracy.

But the American Trades Unionist is shutting his eyes to this truth when he disparages the demand of workers in Europe for wide-reaching social changes that do not bear immediately upon improvement of wages and hours, and describes them as "high-brow fancies." The European worker is merely attempting what the American worker—if the war makes any equivalent demand upon him—will ultimately attempt: to translate into terms of his own intimate daily life the proclaimed objects of the war. The western democracies are fighting, and hundreds of thousands of young Americans will give their lives, in order that Belgians, Serbians, Russians may conserve the right to rule themselves; in order that they—and we—may be secure from the power of an autocracy con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stituting itself virtual master of the world and depriving the mass of freedom.

If we really take that objective seriously, we must all in the western democracy sooner or later be led, as the British workers have been led, to ask with deepening insistence: Are we not too within the hands of an autocracy of our own, with a power in our state as real, though exercised in a different way, as that of the military autocracy in Prussia?

What really was the position of the mass of our workers in respect of freedom and self-government under the old economic order, and what will it be after the war, if working class organization confines its activities within the limits of the older Trades Unionism?

The workers have learned that the mere right to vote for one political party as against another, is a cruel irony when both parties, even when sincerely anxious to execute the will of the mass, are helpless in the grip of a social and economic system really controlled by a power outside politics. But not only does merely political democracy, acting within the limits of the old social and economic order, give the workman no real control over that power; Trades Unionism of the older type is almost as helpless; it is powerless to enable the workers to determine the quality and form of the society of which they are the greater part. The old Unionism can give them greater comfort, attenuate isolated tyrannies; it cannot make them aught but a special service class, socially and culturally inferior to a small, privileged, and normally immensely powerful caste.

For although indiscriminate rhetoric has deprived the fact of some of its dramatic force, it is nevertheless a fact that the present position of private property and capital, and their relationship to political, industrial, legal, social, educational (in which is included, of course, such elements as the newspaper, the "movie" and the drama), religious and eleemosynary institutions, gives real control, in the things that often matter most, into the hands of a little class of favored individuals—an economic autocracy—as truly as political power is held by the political autocracy of Prussia. Can democracy, self-government, be regarded as much more than a meaningless parade while economic control—control over the very means of sustenance—in the hands of a tiny minority holding this power irresponsibly; not, that is, by virtue of any right which has been democratically conferred upon them by the governed, but by the privilege of inheritance, or the result of accident, or even chicanery and anti-social fraud? Can that be a real democracy in which, throughout great provinces, a few men, by virtue of their control of industrial conditions, have power over the daily lives of millions, immeasurably greater than that which, in fact, the Kaiser exercises over the lives of Polish or Alsatian peasants? Or in which power, prestige, leisure, culture, self-government, social deference, are given to this small economic autocracy while the great mass are to be content with an entirely different quality of life, a different culture, accepting the stigma of inferiority, content to train their children to be mere servants and handmaidens? Does it alter the conditions for the better that it is open for an infinitesimal proportion of the great mass, usually by the exercise of exceptional self-assertiveness, a capacity ruthlessly to push aside weaker competitors, to exchange a servile condition for one in which they will profit by social injustice?

The workers in Britain have decided that this is not democracy; that no mere improvement in material conditions can purchase acquiescence in it, or be accepted as a substitute for a more real division of power—for self-government, as desirable in itself apart from any material test; that moral helotry cannot be made acceptable by making it comfortable.

Perhaps we can summarize the situation by saying that the demand of the British democracy is that the mass be partners instead of servants, even though as partners their material condition is no better than it would be as servants. We know as a matter of simple fact that in the case of nine individuals out of ten in our society just that kind of motive is often the predominant one in much of their social action. To ignore it, is to ignore the most powerful social force around us.

It may be "unpractical." So was the determination of the Belgians to defend their national independence.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1918, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY
PHILIP LITTELL
FRANCIS HACKETT
ALVIN JOHNSON

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE: REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Alliance and the League

MEN of an active and civilian mind do not readily resign themselves, even in days so anxious as these, to the abandonment of all political thinking about the war. One line of thought we all know that it is idle to pursue. While the enemy continues its spectacular offensives in France, there is no one in England who would urge the possibility of negotiation. Even those of us who believe that a great chance was squandered last year in the Austrian overtures realize, though it be reluctantly, that no new chance will come again until the enemy learns, by repeated experiments under the favorable conditions of this summer, that a military decision cannot be achieved in the west. He is a sanguine man who feels confident that the chance will come even then. Of what, then, shall we think during these months of suspense? The tendency of those who realize that the war may be lost for want of constructive thought is to turn to the bigger and more permanent problem of the League of Nations. The demand grows for some prompt and official recognition of the idea. Some call for the concerted study and definition of the scheme by the Allied governments. Others go further and demand the actual formation of the League while the war still rages. This latter school is undoubtedly the more vocal in England, and possibly the more influential. The call for study and definition leaves the popular mind cold. It wants an act. It is suspicious of rounded phrases, and tired of declarations which achieve no concrete result, and it is very far from realizing how complicated and speculative is this problem of international organization. It feels instinctively that great creations may be forged in the heat and passion of conflict, which might loom too high above us when the commonplace hours return. An active group of parliamentarians and journalists has been formed, with a broad base in the newspaper world, which presses for immediate steps to realize the League. The motives of this composite group are somewhat various. Of some of them it is not unfair to say that the last thing they desire is the inclusion of our present enemies in the League within our own generation. The League, in their minds, is to be simply the permanent form of the present alliance. They see it confronting a rival League of the Central Powers after a nominal peace, and do not shrink from the consequences of economic war and rivalry in armaments, which this sundering of civilization must entail. There are other members of the group whose view of the future differs fundamentally from that of some of their associates. They realize that a League of Nations which failed to include Germany could not be a League of Peace. They hope to include her within it at the settlement, or at the briefest possible interval after it. They argue that by shaping the League today on the foundation of an arbitration treaty, we should be giving a dramatic proof to the world of the sincerity of our own professions. They reckon that the peoples of Central Europe would be favorably impressed by our action, and that their desire to enter such a League would become a powerful motive tending to a peace of reconciliation. They anticipate that what is today a hostile coalition would come to assume in the eyes of the enemy peoples the character of a potentially friendly association. They insist above all that this formal reconstruction of our alliance would mark in legible words, clear for all to read, the fundamental moral difference between our alliance and the opposing group.

These are sanguine anticipations, and to me it seems that they take no account of the psychology of war time. One crude fact governs the whole thinking of peoples at war. The relation of belligerency is so absorbing that it allows of only one standard attitude towards the enemy and all his works. Whatever he does is necessarily an offense, and patriotism barely tolerates even a cool and discriminating examination of his policy. The presumption is that whatever he may do, and whatever he may purpose, is directed against our own welfare. In a general way the assumption is sound. Each side is bent, for the moment, on inflicting the utmost harm on the other, and neither side will believe that the other side can cease at peace to obey the motives of war. We are all aware of the working of this mentality of war time among ourselves, but we are not sufficiently aware that it is at work also among the Germans. We know from painful experience how much moral courage it requires to speak an appreciative word in public of any single German idea, institution or proposal. The same conditions prevail on the other side of the trench lines. It follows, then, that the first instinct of every normal German will be to regard even an obviously innocent or beneficent action on our part as a manifestation of hostility. Any reconstruction, any evolution of our alliance will seem to them an act of policy directed against them. If we provide for arbitration among ourselves, still more if we give to our Court or to our Council of Conciliation an apparatus of coercion, the enemy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will regard our achievement merely as a method by which we hope to secure concord and discipline within our own belligerent ranks. He will think of it, in short, as a device directed against himself. He is busied himself in similar studies. His "Central Europe" will at least secure peace while it lasts between Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey. Does any pacifist among us rejoice at that? It will make a great continental area of free, or at least relatively free trade. Does any free-trader welcome that as a contribution to the world's progress? It will not be otherwise with our League of Nations. If we form it amid war, and confine it as we must to our own allies, every line of its construction, every idea embodied in its structure, will be subject from the first to a hostile analysis which may fix German thinking for a generation. To enter it will seem an admission of defeat, a last humiliation, an enforced subjection to a hostile coalition. Nor should we, if we are frank with ourselves, be giving a really impressive demonstration of our devotion to arbitration by concluding such a treaty with our allies. The difficulty about arbitration is to arbitrate, not with your friends, but with your enemies. If we wanted to make a demonstration which would be really convincing the test would be to submit to arbitration one of the numerous disputed readings of international law which have involved us in diplomatic contests with neutrals.

Let us submit this policy to an easier test. The world is not yet all enemies and allies. The neutrals include some communities which are patterns of European civilization at its best and centres of moral influence, which even in this riot of force are not negligible. Could we include the neutrals in a League formed during the war? Much depends on what we mean by the League. If we mean nothing more than a simple treaty of arbitration, there is no theoretical objection. There is unfortunately the grave practical objection that it would embarrass our war measures intolerably if Holland, for example, were to sign such a treaty of arbitration and promptly invite us to go to law over our recent seizure of her shipping. If, however, we mean by the idea of a League an association not merely to promote arbitration but to enforce it, if it involves some machinery, however loose, for the organization of its cooperative forces, if it means, as it surely must, some common control of our economic resources, it is impossible that a neutral could enter it during war. To do so would be, morally, if not technically, to abandon neutrality. Any neutral state which enters a League of Allies during the war will have ranged itself on their side and against Germany. That is more than Holland, Denmark or Switzerland would dare to do, and it is what Sweden and Spain would not wish to do. The chief neutral at this moment is Russia. In Russia we do not yet recognize a government with which we could treat. She, if only for that technical reason, must remain outside the League. If we make it today, let us not flatter ourselves that it can expand during the war or while the cleavage of war still lingers. It will be a belligerent League, incapable of any expansion or evolution which might recommend it to the enemy peoples. It must be identified with the coalition which inspires them with resentment and fear, and share with it in their minds all the normal reactions of human pugnacity.

It is well that we should remind ourselves energetically that the idea of a League of Nations, familiar though the phrase now is, is still a novel and speculative conception, capable of many definitions. Is it merely a treaty of arbitration, or is it a first step towards the federal government of the world? Will it rely on national armies, or will it attempt (surely too hazardous a feat) to construct, as Mr. Wells advocates, an international police? Will it ignore the economic relations of states, as the two propagandist societies in America and England seem to assume, or must it on the contrary be built on the control of the world's raw materials, shipping and markets? Will it leave the seas to the control of the strongest navy, as I suppose nine Englishmen in ten assume, or will the League itself, as the French Socialists phrase it, become "the mistress of the seas"? Will it be a mere league of governments, or shall we begin to build up, at an early stage, some structure of representative and democratic control? Does disarmament mean small professional armies, or does it mean national militias? Will it tolerate on any terms defensive alliances among its members? Finally, we must face the biggest question of all. Is the League a close conservative structure, built to secure a precarious security by maintaining for ever the status quo of the war settlement, or is it, on the contrary, an organization which will take growth and ambition into account, and aim at compassing by peaceful means the largest changes as changes become due? None of these questions have yet been faced, even among ourselves. Few of them have been discussed even in books or pamphlets. None of them has been settled by public opinion. There is some crystallization of opinion in America and England. There is little sign of it in France, and none at all elsewhere. There is, as yet, no standard Allied opinion, still less a neutral or a centralist opinion. If we build the League today, we must build it on an Anglo-American model, and build it in conditions which forbid any free interchange of thought.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thinking goes on, but what knowledge have we in these days of each other? How many copies, for example, have reached America of the brilliant little pamphlet in which the French Socialist Party has recorded its idea of a League? If we create the League now, we must deprive ourselves of the constructive and critical contributions which neutral and enemy thinkers might furnish. That may be a serious loss. We must build a League which may suit our mentality and interests, but which to another people will seem alien and uncongenial. Above all, if we form our organization now, a completed stereotyped thing, incapable of amendment or modification, we diminish to zero the possibility that the German mind will ever accept it. No people with a normal measure of self-respect would consent to be excluded from the shaping of an institution which must govern the whole future life of humanity. Humility is not the German foible, and by that procedure we range against ourselves a nation's intellectual pride. If we mean to create a world league, the test of our fitness for the task is that we know how, with infinite patience and tact, to bring all the leading peoples to share in the work of planning and construction. The hour to form this League is at the moment which restores us to peace, no later but no sooner.

London, June. H. N. BRAILSFORD.

The Secret of the German Successes

THE Austrian offensive, though not a complete failure, is a failure by comparison with what the Germans did. It was a political move made under German pressure in order to distract the attention of the people from the crisis in domestic politics. Austria is blessed with three Irelands, the Czechs, Poles and the other Slavs. And what is more there is no "predominant partner" living at home. The predominant partner in Austrian politics is an absentee, Germany, anxious to screw a military dividend out of the country. It will readily be understood how reluctant Austria must have been to deliver her offensive. There can be little doubt what Germany would have liked, having made Austria safe for the present both on the side of Russia and Italy. It would clearly have been to Germany's interest if Austria had attacked on the east of France simultaneously with her own attack on the west. That would have been an exceedingly deadly strategic combination. But it was impossible, first because Austria did not want to do it and secondly, because her army in March was not in a position to do it even if it wanted to. Austria has agreed to make common cause with Germany for the defense of her territory but will not send her troops into France to take part in any offensive movement. For example, if the Allies invaded Alsace-Lorraine they would probably have to meet Austrian troops too, but Austria will not lend men to invade France from Alsace. Germany must have asked her to do so, and as she has not done so Austria must have refused. In the second place the new German offensive tactics require long training and a high state of preparedness which the Austrian army has not reached. German officers have no doubt been training the Austrian army all this year in the new tactics, and in its externals the Austrian attack on June 12th was a very faithful copy of the German original. But it lacked driving power, it was a mere hollow simulacrum of the German offensive—Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen, etc.

What is the secret of the German successes on the west front? Successes we must call them, though their main objects have not been achieved so far and the German people, like confirmed brandy drinkers, by this time need much stronger doses of the poison of military success than they have had this year to achieve any feeling of exhilaration. It is known that the Germans were in two minds for a long time over their offensive and only decided upon it somewhat reluctantly. They must have done so on the assurance of Ludendorff that at last he knew how to do what everyone on the west had hitherto failed to do. To his mind it is a problem partly of strategy and partly of tactics. His great strategic asset was that the Germans had one command and the Allies two, and that fact dictated his choice of the main point at which to strike, namely, at the junction of the two armies. This strategic weakness amongst the Allies has now been cured by the institution of a single command. England and America and France and Italy are now for strategical purposes more united than the Central Powers, and it is an enormous gain. It is in the domain of tactics that the ability of Ludendorff has met with its reward. The battle of Cambrai showed that anything was possible with surprise if only it could be followed up. Ludendorff therefore devoted his efforts in the first place to the achievement of surprise. He preferred misty mornings for his attacks and assisted the efforts of nature by the discharge of artificial fog. Taught by our experiences in Flanders, he was no believer in the prolonged bombardments which blasted a whole country side and made new defensible craters as fast as it destroyed the old trenches. His bombardments of the trenches were of extreme violence, but were short and relied more on gas shells than on heavy explosives. He preferred to make lanes through

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the barbed wire entanglements by means of immense numbers of small howitzers, and the weight of the heavy bombardment was concentrated on the regions behind the lines and not on the lines themselves. He exhausted his ingenuity in devising means for bringing up enormous masses of troops in the shortest possible time. Over and over again in these offensives our troops went to sleep with equal numbers of the enemy facing them and woke up next morning to find themselves outnumbered by 4 to 1. Our aeroplane service, good as it was, never divined half the secrets of German camouflage and, excellent as the system of railway communication established by Geddes was, it could not compare for depth and completeness with the railway ramifications behind the German lines. Not only did Ludendorff elaborate the means of initial surprise on a scale hitherto undreamt of, but he organized a completely new system of advance in which every detail was designed to serve the supreme need of speed. The transport of divisions was so arranged that they could leap-frog—as our men put it—over each other. The functions of the different companies in a battalion were each highly specialized, again with the object of securing a continuous drive forward at the maximum pace. Storm troops were trained in the art of infiltration—in which the utmost advantage was taken of the shape of the land and every possible variety of cover. Massed attacks there certainly were, and all the correspondents had much to say about them; at the same time the arts of the skirmisher, and of a skirmisher armed with machine guns, not with rifles, were well cultivated. Mere accumulation of masses alone would not have accomplished such remarkable results. The specialization of function went further than is generally believed and the accounts we had from neutral sources of the intensive training of the Germans in the rear were evidently not exaggerated. While there were "infiltrators," or skirmishers, and storm troops, there were other troops trained specially in the tasks of cleaning up positions that had been won, so that the advance need not be retarded, as ours so often was, by the task of destroying nests of resistance left behind in the first rush. The whole system had been worked out with exceeding care and was the foundation of the German hopes for a complete and decisive break-through, of the belief that an advance conducted on the new principles would gain in speed and impetus as the days went by. And when we look back on all this elaboration of tactics and training the wonder is not that we lost ground, but that we did not lose a great deal more. Strategically, as Mr. Bonar Law justly observed on June 18th, the German offensive so far has been defeated. It depended for success entirely on surprise and on speed, conditions which were realized at St. Quentin, in the Lys Valley, and later in the early stages of the Aisne offensive. But in the offensive down the Oise and the present Austrian offensive they had been conspicuous by their absence and the results of these later attacks have not been distinguished in kind or in degree from those of our own early efforts. The German offensive is not over and by the time these lines reach America it may have been renewed at another point. But they have failed to get between us and the French and no less conspicuously between the Anglo-French army and the arrival of American reinforcements.

But two definite and very important results have been achieved by the enemy this year, and it is best to be candid and acknowledge them. They have got so near so many points, critical in military or sentimental importance, as the Channel ports, Amiens and the mouth of the Somme, Paris and Venice that their General Staff probably counts on immobilizing a great many troops for their defense, and the more men he has to keep for the defense of fixed points the fewer General Foch has at his disposal for the war of manœuvre and for the decisive blow for which he has been husbanding his reserves. Again, the advantage of interior lines has been greatly increased by the progress made by the Germans in France since March. At the beginning of this year we were dangerously near some of their main arteries; now they have more "pudding," as the children say. When the present offensive ceases we shall know the worst of which they are capable, and the probabilities are that not being capable of a further offensive on the west, they will fall back on the defensive there and make an offensive in the east, as they did in 1915 and 1917; only this time it will not be against Russia, but against England in the east.

Our chief objects then, in the near future, appear to be these: 1—To neutralize the German advantage of interior lines. This is a matter not so much of numbers as of communications by road and rail. 2—To develop by every possible means our supremacy in the air, because this is a way of preventing surprise and also of depriving the Germans of the great advantage they at present possess in waging the war on our territory. 3—To elaborate new tactics of offense against the time when we shall have to solve the problem of a "break-through," that the Germans, in spite of many attempts and many successes, have so far failed to solve. The chief cause of the German successes this year has been not so much their superior numbers, owing to the defection of Russia, but the extreme thoroughness with which they have elaborated the new plans of attacks. 4—To cul-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tivate a "political offensive" against Austria; for a peace with Bulgaria, whose relations with Germany have chilled since the settlement with Rumania, and to prosecute the war with Turkey. 5—To prepare for the time when Germany, no longer able to think of an offensive in France, turns against the English interests in Palestine, in Mesopotamia and on the frontiers of India.

H. SIDEBOTHAM.

London, June 19th.

What Japan is Thinking

THESE questions have often been asked of the writer during the past year: How do the Japanese people feel toward the present war? Why are they not more inclined to help overcome Germany? Do they not understand that this is a struggle for freedom and democracy in the world?

It is becoming increasingly apparent that these questions ought not to go unanswered. At a time when world events of such momentous import are taking place, Japan should not stand in a questionable position. It may be thought that owing to her peculiar traditions and racial characteristics she is unwilling to cooperate in the great movement toward democracy. If she does feel hesitation, the reasons should be stated with absolute candor.

It is no easy task, however, to portray the combined opinion of a nation as a whole. The writer will endeavor simply to present the view of the average practical Japanese business man. And the time is fast approaching in Japan when the opinion of the business man will decide to a large extent the working attitude of Japan toward the western nations.

Naturally the vast majority of the Japanese abhor the ruthless fashion in which Germany carries on the war, and hope for an Allied victory. But we are not yet educated to the idea that the real purpose of the struggle is to decide whether autocracy or democracy is to rule the world. Most of us still interpret the contest as actuated by imperialistic policies. It is rather difficult for Japan to discern virtuous European nations from others, when the test applied is their standards in international dealings. A large portion of Asia is ruled and exploited by these powers. Japan, who has been watching their irresistible onward march, entertains deeply-rooted fear and suspicion of Europe. Even the United States, despite her sincere expression of anti-imperialistic feelings, has to us the appearance of encroachment in the Far East. Japanese people do not know the explanations which seem so satisfactory to Americans, regarding the occasion of their numerous holdings in the Pacific.

This does not mean, however, that the educated and travelled Japanese are not aware that the United States has assumed a definite and generous policy toward the Philippines. We are much impressed with the extremely liberal policy of the United States toward these islands. But the great fortifications at Manila Bay look just as formidable to us as those at Tsintau once did. We are aware that the great naval bases maintained in the Far East by European nations could at any time become a serious menace to us. In fact we can see little connection between the form of government of a nation, and its foreign policy. Even France is a great colonial empire. Differences there are, to be sure, but it is too much to expect that when there are conspicuous causes for anxiety, we should comfort ourselves with minor distinctions.

We believed at the beginning of the war that it was caused mainly by the imperialistic tendencies of the European nations. Therefore we failed to entertain any righteous indignation toward either side. We fought Germany for two definite reasons —to get rid of the German base of operations in the Far East, and to make good our part of the compact in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. We were not, however, and are not now, interested in such an enterprise as changing the form of the internal government of Germany.

The entry of the United States into the war has helped to open our eyes to the deeper issues involved in the struggle. The United States is fighting for great ideals. She has declared through the President of the nation that she desires neither territory nor indemnity. Billions of dollars and millions of her best men are offered for the supreme test. True democracy develops a heroism of its own, and many of us who are here appreciate fully what is now taking place in this country. The United States now commands the admiration of the entire Japanese nation, and I dare say that this is the best guarantee for friendship between the two nations.

Japan is gradually seeing more clearly the true issues of the present struggle, but she has not yet decided to give her all. It will take time and the clearing away of some difficulties to bring about such a change. There are two important causes for our reluctance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

First, racial discrimination against us on the part of all English-speaking nations, although our loyalty to the Allied cause is guaranteeing the safety of the vast Asiatic possessions of the Allies. It cannot be too strongly stated that it would be impossible to rouse Japan to fight for democratic principles that have no impartial application. But pride and a sense of chivalry long inculcated in our tradition does not permit us to importune the English-speaking nations regarding the matter of Japanese exclusion, especially at a time when they are involved in a great struggle. But this delicate problem must be mentioned because a courteous and yet frank exchange of views can alone save nations from the long misunderstandings which culminate in frightful wars. No Japanese will be unreasonable enough to urge or desire the mass immigration of oriental people into this or any other country. The Japanese government is restricting immigration into the United States for instance, with such strict regard for the terms of the "gentleman's agreement" that even the number of students coming to American universities has greatly decreased. In this there is a grave danger, for if it should ever come to pass through strict adherence to this policy that there is a marked decrease in the number of Japanese who understand the United States through having lived here in long and intimate association with its cultivated people, there would be lost one of the most potent sources of goodwill which now exists.

Japanese people wish to be accorded equal treatment with other nations and races. They are a proud people who have at no time in their history submitted to foreign indignity or control. They resent injustice quite as keenly as did the Americans when told by the Germans to keep off the seas if they did not wish to be killed, and they expect their government to have the same concern for their dignity abroad as the British and the Romans of old did of theirs. Although they are not inclined to talk freely or frequently on this subject, they do not forget it. A consistent democracy would confer citizenship on Japanese residing here who do not intend to return to Japan, and who would be willing to pay even such a price as war exacts for the great privilege. The number of such people is small and would in no way alter the racial texture of the country. But the recognition thus accorded would do more than any other one thing to make people in Japan believe in American democracy, and long for its success. Like other sensitive and high-spirited races the Japanese have a delightful characteristic of generous responsiveness to just and kindly treatment.

Americanism is a great and splendid emotional phenomenon, and not at all racial. It is the difference in ideals and not in races that causes international friction. Japanese people do not yet feel moved to help to "make the world safe for democracy" because they do not regard it as having more than a racial application in the minds of its promoters.

A second great reason why we are not more deeply involved in the present struggle, is an economic one. Rightly or wrongly, we feel that Americans as well as Europeans are unwilling that Japan should have free access to the resources of the Far East and Eastern Siberia. We feel that our nation has developed a unique civilization which we must preserve for ourselves, and which if presented in friendly fashion, may help to enrich the western world. And the density of our population compels us to choose one at least of two alternatives that must be incorporated into our national policy. We must either develop industrially to support our crowded population or we must expand territorially. To expand territorially is against the most enlightened public opinion of the world, including that of Japan, although practically all the great empires have been built partly through conquests. But if we develop ourselves industrially only, we must have raw materials, and we must not be subject to the temporary exigencies of other nations in getting them. The connection we make with the Asiatic mainland is, therefore, absolutely vital to our life. The whole Japanese people is well educated to this point of view and could easily be roused to oppose any force that wished to interfere with her economic relations with China and Manchuria. Those who know the history of recent diplomacy in the Far East know that our Allies have not always been our friends in the field of our economic expansion. If western nations want our cooperation in spreading democracy they must honestly study the incompleteness of the present application of their system and make such changes as would educate us to believe in their faith in the universality of their doctrines. It is apparent already to any student of current American thought that the need for such changes is felt by the leading liberal thinkers of the country, but until the American government intimates a similar attitude, there is no assurance on which to rely.

Japan's policy toward China has been unsettled and often aggressive during the past few years. But according to all indications, she has decided to be much more cooperative and liberal in her relations with that country. This is imperative, for Japan must be ready to assume toward China the democratic attitude that she expects from western democracies. Japanese public opinion has shown disapproval of an aggressive policy on the part of the government. If we know that we are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

going to be assisted in friendly fashion by the United States in the great enterprise of promoting the economic, and also moral welfare of the millions now inhabiting our part of the globe, we shall be still more eager for an Allied victory. A few successful joint enterprises of some magnitude in China and Siberia, carried on through the cooperation of various nationalities, would prove to all concerned that international cooperation instead of friction would be the most profitable to all. The writer is particularly desirous of having many enterprises jointly conducted by Americans, Chinese and Japanese.

Another fear entertained by the Japanese regarding their economic future is that after the war there may be a curtailment of the supply of raw material from foreign countries. Our recent experience regarding the American steel embargo quickened our sense of apprehension in this respect. In a war to make their freedom effective, the Allies have brought about a great restriction of trade all over the world. Will this restriction be relinquished when peace is restored, if the Allies emerge from the struggle as supreme dictators? Though the writer has an exceptional opportunity to know that the United States War Trade Board at Washington, for instance, is very liberal and judicious in the use of its great powers, it must be borne in mind that its decisions have nearly ruined many prosperous Japanese enterprises. The effect on the mind of Japanese business men is easy to see. How can they feel assurance that when victorious the big land-owning powers will maintain an open-door policy all over the world?

It is comparatively easy for any nation to think how other nations ought to regard its qualities and good intentions. Consciousness of its own high motives makes this an easy and even agreeable subject of thought. In this the Japanese are no exception. But to maintain working relations, we must go farther and find out not only what other nations really feel toward us, but whether when viewing us from the outside, in the light of our national history, those views may not be justified. This task all nations must now undertake more earnestly than ever before.

There have been expressions from several sources that Japan was assuming a selfish attitude toward the European war, a desire to profit by a situation in which all other nations were undergoing terrible suffering. She has been urged to be generous and to lay aside immediate advantage for the one later sure to accrue from such a course. Does an impartial survey of Asiatic history during the recent years warrant the expectation that Japan could fairly be expected to be ready to take this chivalrous attitude? Is it not too much to expect from a nation, jarred none too gently from its isolation into a position where it felt the need of being ready for self-defense? Should not the West keep this in mind in its thought of Japan at present, and in its future dealings with her? The ingrained restraint of manner of the Japanese, habitual through centuries of training, results in an exterior quite misleading to Americans. But that the people of the Island Empire have in them depths of feeling that make them capable of great generosity and a devotion to world-good, no one who knows them well, can deny. A greater sense of national security and a consciousness of being counted on as co-workers in plans for international betterment would do much to bring still heartier cooperation between Japan and her allies.

The close of the war will bring the time when the growing idealism of the people, on the one hand, will be pitted against the cynicism and selfishness of the old time nationalism on the other. Which will win? Shall Japan be asked to decide this question trustingly when the frankest and finest of the interpreters of western thought admit their deep anxiety as to the outcome? Can Japan be expected to assume that the attitude of President Wilson will dominate the peace conference at the close of the war?

G. SHIBATA.

VERSE

On Clingman Dome

The balsam buds are bluer
From leaning on the sky;
With faces nearer, truer,
The stars pass cousinly.

And here on moss like heather,
As fragrant and as deep,
Safe in the tender weather,
The baby angels sleep.

They curl and tumble near me,
Like little laughing flames;
They nudge and do not fear me,
And whisper me their names.

When with the dawn I waken,
I hear them scurrying,
And stare just half mistaken
Where leaves shine like a wing.

God's truants, but forgiven;
For all day long I see
A silver door in heaven
Lean open coaxingly.

OLIVE DARGAN.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Education of Joan and Peter

II

The Apology of the Schoolmaster

OSWALD clung for some time to the delusion that there must exist somewhere a school that would exactly meet Peter's natural and reasonable demand for an establishment where one would learn about "guns and animals, mountains, machines and foreign people," that would give lessons about "the insides of animals" and "how engines work," and "all that sort of thing." The man wanted a school kept by Leonardo da Vinci. When he found a curriculum singularly bare of these vital matters he began to ask questions.

His questions presently developed into a very tiresome and trying Catechism for Schoolmasters. He did not allow for the fact that most private schoolmasters in England were rather overworked and rather underexercised men with considerable financial worries. Indeed, he made allowances for no one. He wanted to get on with the education of Joan and Peter—and more particularly of Peter.

His Catechism varied considerably in detail, but always it ran upon the lines of the following questions: "What sort of boy are you trying to make? How will he differ from an uneducated boy? I don't mean in manners, I mean how will he differ in imagination? Yes, I said, imagination. . . Don't you *know* that education is building up an imagination? I thought everybody knew that. . . Then what *is* education doing?"

Here usually the Catechized would become troublesome and the Catechist short and rude. The Catechism would be not so much continued as resumed after incivilities and a silence.

"What sort of curriculum is my ward to go through? Why is he to *do* Latin? Why is he to *do* Greek? Is he going to read or write or speak these languages? Then, what is the strange and peculiar benefit of them? What will my ward know about Africa when you have done with him? What will he know about India? Are there any Indian boys here? What will he know about Garibaldi and Italy? About engineering? About Darwin? Will he be able to write good English? Do your boys do much German? Russian? Spanish or Hindustani? Will he know anything about the way the Royal Exchange affects the Empire? But why shouldn't he understand the elementary facts of finance and currency? Why shouldn't every citizen understand what a pound sterling really means? All our everyday life depends on that. What do you teach about Socialism? Nothing! Did you really say Nothing? But he may be a member of Parliament some day. Anyhow, he'll be a voter."

"But if you can't teach him everything, why not leave out these damned classics of yours?" . .

But Justice demanded that Oswald was to hear at last the Apology of the Schoolmaster. He heard it from Mr. Mackinder, the headmaster and proprietor of White Court, on the occasion when Oswald visited him and decided to choose his school out of all other preparatory schools, to be Peter's.

He appeared as a little brown man with a hedgehog's nose and much of the hedgehog's indignant note in his voice. He came, shy and hostile, into the drawing-room in which Oswald awaited him. It was, by the bye, the most drawing-room-like drawing-room that Oswald had ever been in; it was as if some one had said to a furniture dealer, "People expect me to have a drawing-room. Please let me have the sort of drawing room that people expect." It displayed a grand piano towards the French window, a large standard lamp with an enormous shade, a pale silk sofa, an Ottoman, a big fern in an ornate pot, and water colors of Venetian lagoons. In the midst of it all stood Mr. Mackinder, in a highly contracted state, mutely radiating an interrogative "Well?"

"I'm looking for a school for my nephew," said Oswald.

"You want him here?"

"Well, do you mind if first of all I see something of the school?"

"We're always open to investigation," said Mr. Mackinder, bitterly.

"I want to do the very best I can for this boy. I feel very strongly that it's my duty to him and the country to turn him out—as well as a boy can be turned out."

Mr. Mackinder nodded his head, and continued to listen.

This was something new in schoolmasters. For the most part they had opened themselves out to Oswald, like sunflowers, like the receptive throats of nestlings. They had embraced and silenced him by the wealth of their assurances.

"I have two little wards," he said. "A boy and a girl. I want to make all I can of them. They ought to belong to the Elite. The strength of a country—of an empire—depends ultimately almost entirely on its Elite. This empire isn't overwhelmed with intelligence, and most of the talk we hear about the tradition of statesmanship—."

Mr. Mackinder made a short noise through his nose that seemed to indicate his opinion of contemporary statesmanship.

"You see, I take this schooling business very solemnly. These upper-class schools, I say, these schools for the sons of prosperous people and scholarship winners, are really Elite-making machines. They really make—or fail to make—the Empire. That makes me go about asking schoolmasters a string of questions. Some don't like my questions. Perhaps they are too elementary. I ask: What is this education of yours up to? What is the design of the whole. What is this preparation of yours for? This is called a Preparatory School. You lay the foundations. What is the design of the building for which these foundations are laid?"

He paused, determined to make Mr. Mackinder say something before he discoursed further.

"It isn't so simple as that," was wrung from Mr. Mackinder. "Suppose we just walk round the school? Suppose we just see the sort of place it is and what we are doing here? Then perhaps you'll be able to see better what we contribute—in the way of making a citizen."

The inspection was an unusually satisfactory one. White Court was one of the few private schools Oswald had seen that had been built expressly for its purpose. Its classrooms were well lit and well arranged, its little science museum seemed good and well arranged and well provided with diagrams; its gymnasium was business-like; its wall blackboards unusually abundant and generously used, and everything was tidy. Nevertheless the Catechism for School-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

masters was not spared. "Now," said Oswald, "now for the curriculum?"

"We live in the same world with most other English schools," Mr. Mackinder sulked. "This is a preparatory school."

"What are called English subjects?"

"Yes."

"How do you teach geography?"

"With books and maps."

Oswald spoke of lantern slides and museum visits. The cinema had yet to become an educational possibility.

"I do what I can," said Mr. Mackinder. "I'm not a millionaire."

"Do you do classics?"

"We do Latin. Clever boys do a little Greek. In preparation for the public schools."

"Grammar, of course? . ."

"What else? . ."

"French, German, Latin, Greek, bits of mathematics, botany, geography, bits of history, bookkeeping, music lessons, some water color painting; it's very mixed," said Oswald.

"It's miscellaneous."

Mr. Mackinder roused himself to a word of defense: "The boys don't specialize."

"But this is a diet of scraps," said Oswald, reviving one of the more controversial topics of the Catechism. "Nothing can be done thoroughly."

"We are necessarily elementary."

"It's rather like the White Knight in Alice in Wonderland, packing his luggage for nowhere."

"We have to teach what is required of us," said Mr. Mackinder.

"But what is education up to?" asked Oswald.

As Mr. Mackinder offered no answer to that riddle, Oswald went on: "What *is* Education in England up to, anyhow? In Uganda we knew what we were doing. There was an idea in it. The old native tradition was breaking up. We taught them to count and reckon English fashion, to read and write; we gave them books and the Christian elements, so that they could join on to our civilization and play a part in the great world that was breaking up their little world. We didn't teach them anything that didn't serve mind or soul or body. We saw the end of what we were doing. But half this school teaching of yours is like teaching in a dream. You don't teach the boy what he wants to know and needs to know. You spend half his time on calculations he has no use for, mere formal calculations, and on this dead language stuff—! It's like trying to graft mummy steak on living flesh. It's like boiling fossils for soup."

Mr. Mackinder said nothing.

"And, damn it!" said Oswald petulantly, "your school is about as good a school as I've seen or am likely to see. . ."

"I have an idea," he went on, "of just getting the very best out of those two youngsters—the boy especially—of making every hour of his school work a gift of so much power or skill or subtlety, of opening the world to him like a magic book. . . . The boy's tugging at the magic covers. . ."

He stopped short.

"There are no such schools," said Mr. Mackinder compactly. "This is as good a school as you will find."

And there he left the matter for a time. But in the evening he dined with Oswald at his hotel, and it may be that iced champagne had something to do with a certain relaxation from his afternoon restraint. Oswald had already arranged about Peter, but he wanted the little man to talk more. So he set him an example. He talked of his own life. He represented it as a life of disappointment and futility. "I envy you your life of steadfast usefulness." He spoke of his truncated naval career, of the years of uncertainty that had followed. He talked of the ambitions and achievements of other men, of the large hopes and ambitions of youth. Now blackwater fever drove him out of Africa—to become a valetudinarian at five and forty.

"I too," said Mr. Mackinder, warming for a moment, and then left his sentence unfinished. Oswald continued to generalize. . .

"All life, I suppose, is disappointment—is anyhow largely disappointment," said Mr. Mackinder presently.

"We get something done."

"Five per cent, ten per cent, of what we meant to do."

The schoolmaster reflected. Oswald refilled his glass for him.

"To begin with, I thought, none of these other fellows really know how to run a school. I will make a nest of Young Paragons. I will take a bunch of boys and get the best out of them, the best possible; watch them, study them, foster them, make a sort of boy so that the White Court brand shall be looked for and recognized. . ."

He sipped his faintly seething wine and put down the glass.

"Five per cent," he said; "ten per cent, perhaps." He touched his lips with his dinner napkin. "I have turned out some creditable boys."

"Did you make any experiments in the subjects you taught?"

"At first. But one of the things we discover in life as we grow past the first flush of beginning, is just how severely we are conditioned. We are conditioned. We seem to be free. And we are in a net. You have criticized my curriculum today pretty severely, Mr. Sydenham. Much that you say is absolutely right. It is wasteful, discursive, ineffective. Yes. . . But in my place I doubt if you could have made it much other than it is. . ."

"One or two things I do. Latin grammar here is taught on lines strictly parallel with the English and French and German; that is to say we teach languages comparatively. It was troublesome to arrange, but it makes a difference mentally. And I take a class in Formal Logic; English teaching is imperfect, expression is slovenly, without that. The boys write English verse. The mathematical teaching, too, is as modern as the examining boards will let it be. Small things perhaps. But you do not know the obstacles.

"Mr. Sydenham, your talk today has reminded me of all the magnificent things I set out to do here when I sank my capital in building this place six and twenty years ago. When I found that I couldn't control the choice of subjects, when I found that in that matter I was ruled by the sort of schools and colleges the boys had to go on to and by the preposterous examinations they would have to pass, then I told myself, 'at least I can cultivate their characters and develop something like a soul in them, instead of crushing out individuality and imagination as most schools do. . .'

"Well, I think I have a house of clean-minded and cheerful and willing boys, and I think they all tell the truth. . ."

"I don't know what I'm to do with the religious teaching of these two youngsters of mine," said Oswald abruptly. "Practically they're godless."

Mr. Mackinder did not speak for a little while. Then he said: "It is almost unavoidable, under existing condi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions, that the religious teaching in a school should be—formal and orthodox."

"For my own part—I'm liberal," said Mr. Mackinder, and added, "very liberal. Let me tell you, Mr. Sydenham, exactly how I see things."

He paused for a moment as if he collected his views.

"If a little boy has grown up in a home, in the sort of home which one might describe as God-fearing, if he has not only heard of God, but seen God as a living influence upon the people about him, then—then, I admit, you have something real. He will believe in God. He will know God. God—simply because of the faith about him—will be a knowable reality. God is a faith. In men. Such a boy's world will fall into shape about the idea of God. He will take God as a matter of course. Such a boy can be religious from childhood—yes. . . But there are very few such homes."

"Less probably than there used to be?"

Mr. Mackinder disavowed an answer by a gesture of hands and shoulders. He went on, frowning slightly as he talked. He wanted to say exactly what he thought. "For all other boys, Mr. Sydenham, God for all practical purposes does not exist. Their worlds have been made without him; they do not think in terms of him; and if he is to come into their lives at all he must come in from the outside—a discovery, like a mighty rushing wind. By what is called Conversion. At adolescence. Until that happens you must build the soul on pride, on honor, on the decent instincts. It is all you have. And the less they hear about God the better. They will not understand. It will be a cant to them, a kind of indelicacy. The two greatest things in the world have been the most vulgarized. God and sex. . . If I had my own way I would have no religious services for my boys at all."

"Instead of which?"

Mr. Mackinder paused impressively before replying.

"The local curate is preparing two of my elder boys for confirmation at the present time."

He gazed gloomily at the tablecloth. "If one could do as one liked!" he said. "If only one could do as one liked!"

But now Oswald was realizing for the first time the eternal tragedy of the teacher, that sower of unseen harvests, that reaper of thistles and the wind, that serf of custom, that subjugated rebel, that feeble, persistent antagonist of the triumphant things that rule him. And behind that immediate tragedy Oswald was now apprehending for the first time something more universally tragic, an incessantly recurring story of high hopes and a gray ending, the story of boys and girls, clean and sweet-minded, growing up into life, and of the victory of world inertia, of custom, drift and the tarnishing years. Now he would listen to Mr. Mackinder, now his thoughts would soar out from that thread of talk into this new realization of the conflict between incessant tradition on the one hand and upon the other the weak and transitory outbreaks of the vital impulse in men.

Mr. Mackinder spoke of his own youth. Quite early in life had come physical humiliations, the realization that his slender and delicate physique debarred him from most active occupations, and his resolve to be of use in some field where his weak and undersized body would be at no great disadvantage. "I made up my mind that teaching should be my religion," he said.

He told of the difficulties he had encountered in his attempts to get any pedagogic science or training. "This is the most difficult profession in the world," he said, "and the most important. Yet it is not studied, it has no established practice; it is not endowed. Buildings are endowed and institutions, but not teachers." And in Great Britain, in the schools of the classes that will own and rule the country, ninety-nine per cent of the work was done by unskilled workmen, by low-grade genteel women and young men. In America the teachers were now nearly all women. "How can we expect to raise a nation nearly as good as we might do under such a handicap?" He had read and learned what he could about teaching; he had served for small salaries in schools that seemed living and efficient; finally he had built his own school with his own money. He had had the direst difficulties in getting a staff together. "What can one expect?" he said. "We pay them hardly better than shop assistants—less than bank clerks. You see the relative importance of things in the British mind." What hope or pride was there to inspire an assistant schoolmaster to do good work?

"I thought I could make a school different from all other schools, and I found I had to make a school like most other fairly good schools. I had to work for what the parents required of me, and the ideas of the parents had been shaped by their schools. I had never dreamt of the immensity of the resistance these would offer to constructive change. In this world there are incessant changes, but most of them are landslides or epidemics. . . I tried to get away from stereotyping examinations. I couldn't. I tried to get away from formal soul-destroying religion. I couldn't. I tried to get a staff of real assistants. I couldn't. I had to take what came. I had to be what was required of me. . .

"One works against time always. Over against the Parents. It is not only the boys one must educate, but the parents—let alone one's self. The parents demand impossible things. I have been asked for Greek and for bookkeeping by double entry by the same parent. I had—I had to leave the matter—as if I thought such things were possible. After all the parent is master. One can't run a school without boys."

"You'd get *some* boys," said Oswald.

"Not enough. I'm up against time. The school has to pay."

"Can't you hold out for a time? Run the school on a handful of oatmeal?"

"It's running it on an overdraft I don't fancy. You're not a married man, Mr. Sydenham, with sons to consider."

"No," said Oswald, shortly. "But I have these wards. And, after all, there's not only today, but tomorrow. If the world is going wrong for want of education, if you don't give it your sons will suffer."

"Tomorrow, perhaps. But today comes first. I'm up against time. Oh, I'm up against time."

He sat with his hands held out supine on the diaper before him.

"I started my school twenty-seven years ago next Hilary. And it seems like yesterday. When I started it I meant it to be something memorable in schools. . . I jumped into it. I thought I should swim about. . . It was like jumping into the rapids of Niagara. I was seized, I was rushed along. . . Ai! Ai! . ."

"Time's against us all," said Oswald. "I suppose the next glacial age will overtake us long before we're ready to fight out our destiny."

"If you want to feel the generations rushing to waste," said Mr. Mackinder, "like rapids—like rapids—you must put your heart and life into a private school."

H. G. Wells.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORRESPONDENCE

Propaganda in Russia

SIR: Some suggest that we intervene in Russia; some suggest that we wait for Russia, or a substantial faction in Russia, to invite us, and then intervene. Does not the same infirmity attend both plans; namely, that long before an Allied army could cover the thousands of miles between its base and its enemy, *the* faction of Russia, the faction which is its real reservoir of physical force, would be turned against us? Or enough of them turned against us to frustrate all cooperation, and perhaps even to sell us out to Germany?

That faction consists of the eighty per cent of the Russian population which can neither read nor write. These are not yet, indeed, literally a faction, but they are a potential faction, or they can be transformed into a faction by German propaganda, especially if we provide German propaganda with such a pretext as the presence of Allied armies on Russian soil. It would do no good to "tell" these credulous folk that our motives are pure, nor would it do any good to point out to them that Germany is now in the very act of robbing them. Our message would never arrive. They could not read it. What are newspapers and hand-bills to them? No, the message would never arrive in the form in which we sent it. The message would arrive in whatever form Germany should choose to give it. By the time it arrived, it would be we who would figure as the robber, and Germany would be the rescuer.

But why, then, should the German message arrive, since Russians who cannot read Russian cannot read German? The answer is: German propaganda; the answer is: a German bureau, a German system, a system for word-of-mouth propaganda; a German organization with ramifications and tentacles, with multitudes of ready-loaded talkers and with rivers of cash, floating lies and innuendoes. Would not the months between the launching and the arriving of an Allied army, along with a simple protestation of purity of motive, suffice for this swarm of German talkers and this net-work of German money, to put us in the wrong with Russia's illiterate and most credulous millions? Ask Mr. Mott how readily they yield to the plausible talker.

How, then, are we to cope with this babbling enemy? Must it not be by a corresponding propaganda? Should we not organize a mammoth bureau for word-of-mouth truth-telling in Russia?

For what is the object we pursue? It is not a military object. Even if we pursue it with an army, it is not a military object. In a military sense, an Allied army in Russia would be a derision; not a military investment, but a military sacrifice. It would divide our forces. It would weaken us on the west, where the decision must come. It would put half a million of us on ground unfamiliar to us, but familiar to Germany,—more familiar to Germany than to Russia, as witness the foundering of Russia's hosts in the Massurian Lakes! If Russia foundered at her strongest, might we not founder too? That would be propaganda—on behalf of Germany; for one more defeat loaded on sick Russia, would leave Russia and Russia's faith crushed beyond all power to deny the whispering Mephistopheles of Berlin.

No—our only object in Russia, army or not, is one of persuasion; it is to keep Russia from selling her soul to Germany. Germany is forever nearing the end of her resources, but never quite reaching it; always she has one more card up her sleeve; and this time it may be Russian man-power, whether at arms or in industry. Either way would serve; and we may be sure that already Germany's talk-fest is hard at work, like a hive of bees and a nest of ants.

Against this propaganda let us act. For once let us be thorough, and for once let us be in time. Let us not meet the enemy; let us forestall him. That is what he has ever done to us, beginning forty years ago. He forestalls,—we meet,—he forestalls again; and so we keep going in a fruitless circle, always stronger than the enemy potentially, but never stronger at the right time and place.

This time he must not get away; this time he must reach the end of his resources when he seems to reach it. While our fighters and our resources stream in from the West, let not Germany tap the East. If a small army of Allied fighters does figure in the East, let it be as an auxiliary to a large army of talkers and a flying squadron of cartoonists, organized perhaps by Mr. Mott, recruited from Russians in America, in Russia, in Switzerland, and accompanied by economic assistance. Words, cartoons, dollars, big enough and on time:—is not this the thing? When Professor Masaryk says: "Diplomacy before an army," does he not mean this?

HERBERT W. FISHER.

Battle Creek, Michigan.

More Misstatements

SIR: Your reply to my letter, published in The New Republic of May 18th, contains as many misstatements of fact as you made in the original editorial which I controverted. For instance, you affirm that "the movement of cattle from the drought regions of the southwest and the distribution of feeds was the work of the Food Administration—not of the department." This work was inaugurated before the Food Administration had a legal existence. It was conducted by the employees of the department and the Agricultural College of Texas in cooperation.

I have already sent you a memorandum of the action of the Executive Committee of the Cattle Raisers' Association, in session at Fort Worth on June 11th, thanking the Department of Agriculture for this service. Surely the cattle raisers know who served them. The Food Administration rendered some valuable assistance in helping to get preferred car movement, and especially in purchasing velvet beans and in requisitioning cottonseed meal in the exercise of legal powers which the department did not possess.

As to the licensing of farm machinery and wholesale dealers, you seem to forget that this is a power vested wholly in the President, who has recently exercised the power upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture. It is difficult to say that it would not have been practical or wise to do so sooner.

Complete answer to all your tirade is the outstanding fact of last year's crop yields and the gratifying fact of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this year's increased acreage, which have been influenced by the Department of Agriculture, the land grant colleges, the farmers' organizations, and the agricultural press. In spite of great difficulties the farmers have responded with amazing energy to the appeals of this body of leadership.

CLARENCE OUSLEY,
Assistant Secretary.

U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.

Drawing the Faith Line

SIR: In your issue of June 22, 1918, Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant in her article, Y. M. C. A. and A. E. F., states regarding the personnel of the "Foyer on Soldat," conducted by the Y. M. C. A., that "contrary to popular superstition, there is no religious qualification. Undoubtedly religiously minded men with liberal views are peculiarly acceptable to the board, but the non-religious are also welcome, provided they are tolerant enough to meet a religious doubt or request for a testament with sympathy."

My own limited experience and information prompt me to state by way of comment that if the policy Miss Sergeant mentions prevails, it is of comparatively recent origin, for I know personally one man who was told, not quite a year ago, that he could not be considered at all in that connection because he was a Roman Catholic. I know another, who could claim membership in no church—although he came of Christian parents—and was rejected on that ground and that alone. I know of still another who had an application on file for months, only to be told on further inquiry that he was not affiliated with any church, and consequently was not accepted. He was told, however, that he might send in another application, which would perhaps meet with favorable action. Correspondence with those best authorized to speak for the Y. M. C. A. and its policy failed to reveal any great liberalism and was marked by clear failure to answer specifically certain definite and pertinent questions.

If the Y. M. C. A. sees fit to carry out its work in this spirit there can be no complaint, but let us have no doubt as to the fact that to judge from the cases detailed above there *is* a very definite religious qualification.

W. A. MCLAUGHLIN.

Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Our Allies the East Siders

SIR: When Mr. Hoover says to America, "Our Allies need wheat," we begin at once to live upon less of it, so their wants shall be filled. And this doesn't seem strange or surprising, but perfectly natural.

Can we carry this further? The next time there's a period of unemployment and want in New York, suppose somebody says: "Our Allies the East Siders need bread: the rest of us must therefore eat less until they are supplied."

Would we hoot such a speaker?

The other day Mr. Hoover had an honorary degree conferred on him at Yale. His audience had been going without foods they liked, month after month, and had been submitting to irksome restrictions, and so forth. And when they saw the man who was responsible for this being honored, did they hoot at him? No! They cheered with a fervor that made Woolsey Hall fairly shake.

CLARENCE DAY, JR.

New York City.

The Zionists and a University

SIR: Since the timely article on A Jewish University, which appeared in the New Republic of June 29th, was written, the Zionist Organization of America held its convention at Pittsburgh. Seven statements of principle were adopted with much enthusiasm, all except one dealing with education and social policy. The organization in America is now committed to free education in Hebrew embracing all grades and departments, to public ownership of all natural resources and public utilities, and to the cooperative principle in agriculture and finance. The only political statement of the seven declared for "political equality irrespective of race, sex, or faith of all the inhabitants" of Palestine.

It is noteworthy that the convention represented the general Zionist movement of America, including such men as Justice Brandeis, Judge Mack, Felix Frankfurter, and H. M. Kallen, but the extreme Socialist forces have their own party and were not in Pittsburgh.

NORMAN WINESTINE.

New York City.

A Snare for Men of Property

SIR: I have discovered a way to prove to a man of property that he is really an I. W. W.

You get him first into saying that "these fellows who go around raising trouble" are simply "trying to take by force what they couldn't get by ability and hard work." Avoid questioning him why it is that they couldn't get it by ability and hard work. Merely agree.

Then ask him why it is that men who are solidly grounded in production goods don't go around trying to get more by force. Avoid, of course, suggesting that they do.

He will reply that it is because property owners have the true interests of society at heart, believe warmly in comfort and the school system, stand responsible for law and order, worship God and aren't despicable thieves and anarchists like the men who go on strike. So then you ask him—not too rapidly—if it isn't their ownership of property that makes them that way. Unless he believes in family he will say Yes, largely so. If he believes in family this won't work. Nothing would.

When he says Yes, largely so, you have him. Tell him that the men who want property "divided up" are in fact headed toward precisely that same safe set of standards and beliefs that inflates himself. Tell him that the "anarchist" is really seeking for a stake in society to tie himself to. Tell him that the infamous striker, whether realizing it or not, is hurling himself to certain extinction in a whole world of property holders—a universe of hims.

Conclude by insinuating a doubt as to whether he may not be subtly a traitor to his class by seeking to slow down this process.

Ever since I tried this on one of my friends he has been able to read the New York Times's accounts of the Russian revolution without undue worry as to the future. He sees in Russia a potential heaven of perfectly conservative property holders—one unbroken chamber of commerce from Poland to the Pacific. This is a social gain, for the added sleep has made him kinder to his help.

Do not employ this argument too frequently or it will ruin your own faith in the desirability of economic reform.

ERNEST JEROME HOPKINS.

University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, California.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books and Things

A FEW pages of Anna Karenina, when I read it for the first time thirty years ago, were quite enough to convince me that it was the greatest novel in the world. Many of the other greatest novels in the world were still to read. I admitted the fact. But this conscious ignorance could not shake my faith. I had been travelling, and was making a stay in a part of the United States which I had never seen, which I innocently called " the west," and which offered to curiosity, on the shore of Lake Ontario, people, occupations, manners, habits, landscape that were all unfamiliar. This curiosity had been strong, but it could not compete with the feeling awakened by Anna Karenina, which effaced the pale real world, brought one into unbelievably close contact with so much life, gave one a hundred new thirsts and freedoms. What novel short of the greatest could cause effects like these?

Imagine your first meeting with a woman whose loveliness and grace and radiance outshone the brightest that your experience had given you hope of seeing, a woman who drank joy from deep-hidden springs. Imagine, if you can, your emotion when she turned into a cannibal. Imagine the later events of her history combining to prove that cannibalism wrecked, broke, destroyed her, while all the time her charm could not die, but lived on so clear and unspoiled that your opinion of cannibalism underwent great change, and a new tolerance flooded your soul. For " cannibalism " read " adultery." I had been brought up to regard adultery as I now regard the most German of atrocities, plus the warning that it was a thing never to be named, except at morning service. Not for a moment was Anna the kind of woman whom I had been taught to think the only kind who ever committed adultery. For this access of tolerance my education, it is only fair to say, had been an unintentional preparation. Without at all meaning to, my elders had turned my curiosity about sex away from all relations sanctioned by the church and had concentrated it, timid and fascinated, upon illicitness. All things considered, my misreading of the story of Anna and Vronsky, my misplacing of the emphasis, was natural enough.

Thirty years ago, being in love with Anna, I was as a matter of course persuaded of Vronsky's unworthiness. This conviction lived at peace with the conviction that I had rather resemble Vronsky than Levin, and that Vronsky's imperturbability, his haughtiness when interrupted at breakfast by brother-officers whom he did not like, his indifference to criticism, were as inimitable as his good looks. His character and appearance were food for despair, and one turned to Levin for comfort, not in vain. Here was a man shy and awkward in company, confused when he made the same remark twice, a maker and breaker of resolutions, yet nowise despicable, a man liked and even loved.

> The common problem, yours, mine, every one's,
> Is—not to fancy what were fair in life
> Provided it could be—but, finding first
> What may be, then find how to make it fair
> Up to our means: a very different thing!

I had read this: I had tried to believe it. Levin's character and destiny was a concrete proof that the problem was not insoluble, that one's means might be good enough.

Yet nobody's egotism, even at nineteen, could be so blind as not to see that Anna Karenina was other things than a consoler and liberator and disheartener of one's self. It was the whole of life, it was a house of death and birth, it was a place where the everyday miracles revealed their graver meanings. Watching by the deathbed of Levin's brother one saw, listening to Kitty's cry in childbirth one heard, with a distinctness rare in one's own sensations, the nearness of man to the other animals. All the sudden poetry of spring, changing Levin's heart with the change of season, taught one to know, as one knows cold or heat or pain, man's nearness to earth. Even at nineteen, however, I was troubled because Levin, the seeker, came so near finding the meaning of life. I remember suspecting that one part of life was to go on wondering forever what life might mean.

Unless one is more than common stupid, which few of us think ourselves, thirty years make large changes in most great books. In advance of experience one craves substitutes for it. Later one cannot help looking for likenesses and contrasts between the book and experience. But Anna Karenina is not this kind of great book. To a young reader it is one of these substitutes for experience which immediately become part of experience, so that one of the things you compare it with and test it by, after no matter how many years, is itself. And it has no secrets. All the abundant life in it is seen with the last distinctness, represented with concise explicitness. The steeplechase which Vronsky loses, and which breaks Frou Frou's back, is not more distinctly seen than those obscurer places, in Anna's soul or Levin's upon which Tolstoi turns his amazing daylight. Last week, when I had reread Anna Karenina, this was the new impression I most noticed, that I was over-acquainted with the principal characters, that they were all too distinctly exhibited, that there were no planes in these landscapes of the soul and no lost lines, that nobody's unconscious had any privacy.

This was not, of course, the only impression I felt as new. For the first time I noticed how carefully Tolstoi builds up his case against adultery, how artfully he represents it as capable of doing thoroughly frivolous men and women no harm, how cautiously he keeps his Christian distrust of the flesh from appearing on any page that tells of Anna and Vronsky, how different Anna's fate might have been if Vronsky had had a passion for excavating buried cities, or for anticipating Mr. Edison. The first time I read the book I accepted submissively the words Tolstoi put at the head of its first chapter—" vengeance is mine, I will repay." Today his " moral " seems better expressed in this passage from Santayana: " Love itself dreams of more than mere possession; to conceive happiness, it must conceive a life to be shared in a varied world, full of events and activities, which shall be new and ideal bonds between the lovers. But unlawful love cannot pass out into this public fulfilment. It is condemned to be mere possession—possession in the dark, without an environment, without a future. It is love among the ruins . . . love among the ruins of themselves and of all else they might have had to give to one another."

Is Anna Karenina the greatest novel in the world? No, the world has not seen and probably never will see its greatest novel. But the phrase is not always vile. It often serves to express a feeling for which no other words will do so well, a feeling that is even stronger in me, I think, while I read War and Peace or Crime and Punishment. Does Anna Karenina contain the whole of life? Of course not, yet this phrase too serves to express, with just exaggeration, a reader's wonder at the many living men and women whom Tolstoi created, only a few in his own image. But a rereader, though he may not feel that much life has been left out of Anna Karenina, cannot help feeling, at the present moment, that Tolstoi left out a good deal of Russia.

P. L.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Purple Cows

Tarr, by Wyndham Lewis. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $1.75.

NOT for ages will Greenwich Village be able to secrete a novel like this. Mr. Lewis takes it from the Knackfus Quarter in Paris, where a small group of artists and bourgeois-bohemians, German and Russian and English, coil together. It is to Greenwich Village what real Camembert is to a dry domestic variety. And this section cut out by Mr. Lewis is quite ripe for cutting. He almost swims in it.

Outside baseball criticism nothing more intensive or special can be imagined in the English language than Mr. Lewis's effort to project Tarr. The theme is by no means too much for Mr. Lewis. He knows his Tarr and his Bertha Lunken and his Kreisler and his Lipmann bourgeois-bohemian circle. He knows his Anastasya Vasek. The trouble is, he knows them too well, is involved in them and infected with them. He is like a man trying to step off his own shadow, to see what it is like. The result, to say the least of it, is eccentric. And only those who already have a fair notion of Mr. Lewis's world are likely to do full justice to his clevernesses.

Long-haired artists receive no sympathy from Mr. Lewis, for example. An artstruck Englishman is very early assaulted by Tarr to indicate that this novel is not hirsutic. "The Cambridge set you represent is, as observed in an average specimen, a cross between a Quaker, a Pederast and a Chelsea artist. = Your Oxford brothers; dating from the Wilde decade, are a stronger body. The Chelsea Artists are much less flimsy. The Quaker are powerful rascals. You represent, my dear fellow, the *dregs* of Anglo-Saxon civilization!= There is nothing softer on earth.= Your flabby potion is a mixture of the lees of Liberalism, the poor froth blown off the decadent nineties, the wardrobe-leavings of a vulgar Bohemianism with its headquarters in Chelsea! You are concentrated, systematic slop." This is undoubtedly important, if true, especially to the Cambridge man. It contains the subject-matter of a new Pemberton Billing libel case, couched in somewhat the same language as Billing's and exhibiting the same "greedy, fleshy, frantic strength." But to read it as an outsider is like listening in on a wrangle between rival fish-dealers. Mr. Lewis forgets that Chelsea artists, Quakers and Pederasts are better known to him than to ourselves.

Mr. Lewis tells us, however, that his people in the Knackfus Quarter "are largely ignorant of all but their restless personal lives." This is true. They live in their effort to subdue sex to art or art to sex—they work both ends—and when the complication of pennilessness is introduced the degree of restlessness is accentuated almost beyond belief. The great merit of the book is its reflection of this restlessness, but by reason of Mr. Lewis's fierce localism it becomes phantasmagoric—and the appetite for phantasmagoria is not universal.

One may follow with interest the peregrinations of Tarr in his quest of wisdom as to marrying his German mistress. Should he, an artist of genius, marry this lump? "'She is a high standard Aryan female, in good condition, superbly made; of the succulent, obedient, clear peasant type. It is natural that in my healthy youth, living in these Bohemian wastes, I should catch fire. But that is not the whole of the picture. She is unfortunately not a peasant. She has German culture, and a florid philosophy of love.= She is an art-student.=She is absurd.'" The plebescite is rather against Tarr's marrying her. The chiefly interesting thing, however, is his own philosophy. It has the morality of the Successful Man written all over it. He is a rutting animal, whether artist, Pittsburger or German, and he employs the lingo of Pittsburg to describe woman. "Now as to sex; Socrates married a shrew; most of the wisest men marry fools, picture-post-cards, cows or strumpets." These are the only classifications in the novel. They are classifications with which any sexual profiteer would be thoroughly at home.

A cruder sexual animal is Otto Kreisler. Under the bony scaffolding of this German it is hard to find a social instinct. We see him, at any rate, when he is out on his own. He is smitten by Anastasya. They "Anastasya" and "Otto" each other across the restaurant table the moment they meet. But Anastasya is equally polite to a handsome Pole and this infuriates Kreisler. His savage eruption into the bourgeois-bohemian dance is an episode narrated with much acid gaiety. The separation between Bertha and Tarr flings Bertha in the way of Kreisler. The German rapes her, (Mr. Lewis calls it "a jest too deep for laughter"), and in between that incident and the birth of her child Kreisler entangles the handsome Pole in a duel, a grotesque affair that is terminated by the sudden death of the Pole after an attempt to throttle Kreisler—with Kreisler's escape and arrest and suicide as a colophon.

To give the right value to these "restless personal lives" Mr. Lewis might have introduced something besides his fatiguing tricks of style. But it is part of his technique to adopt odd methods of punctuation and to write invertedly. "She owned humorously a good-natured face with protruding eyes, gesticulated with, filling her silences with explosive significance." A manner so cacophonous as Mr. Lewis's is distinctly unpleasant, but he is seldom stupid except spiritually and he is often extraordinarily keen. His habit of personifying the dead ("the envelope pregnant with revolutionary joy and seried German marks") and de-personifying the alive, gives a false vivacity to his expression. The most pronounced example of this oddity is perhaps his description of Anastasya, as she dawns on the German. "One plethoric impression of her was received—although *from* her—installment of a senseless generosity." So the description begins, unintelligibly enough. "She wore a heavy black burnous, very voluminous and severe; a large ornamental bag was on the chair at her side, which one expected to contain herbs and trinkets, paraphernalia of the witch, rather than powder, lip-cream and secrets. Her hat was immense and sinuous; generally she implied an egotistic code of advanced order, full of insolent strategies. . . . When she laughed, this commotion was transmitted to her body as though sharp, sonorous blows had been struck on her mouth. Her lips were long hard bubbles risen in the blond heavy pool of her face, ready to break, pitifully and gaily. Grown forward with ape-like intensity, they refused no emotion of noisy egress if it got so far. Her eyes were large, stubborn and reflective, brown coming out of blondness. Her head was like a deep white egg in a tobacco-colored nest. She exuded personality with alarming and disgusting intensity. It was an ostentation similar to diamonds and gold watch-chains. Kreisler felt himself in the midst of a cascade, a hot cascade." She dawns on Tarr, later, as "swagger sex," and they get drunk together. "'Bless Waste,'" they cry, "'Heaven bless Waste!=Hoch Waste! . . . Economy is sedition. Drink your blood if you have no wine,'" and so on. Later Anastasya calls the garçon. "'This gentleman, garçon, wants to be a lion

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with fleas on his back—at least so he says! At the same time he wants a slave. I don't know if he expects the slave to catch his fleas or not. I haven't asked him. But he's a funny looking bird, isn't he?'" Bertha and Tarr marry, in spite of Anastasya, but Tarr only sees Bertha from 4 p. m. to 7 p. m. The rest of the time he lives with "his illicit and splendid bride." Bertha eventually divorces him, when he takes up with another lady, and another . . .

Mr. Lewis's novel seems to have a vast deal to do with sex, but sex is only a symbol for its parade of wilfulness—a horribly exaggerated wilfulness, certainly not a remunerative one. The inhumanity of the book is not less striking than the inhumanity of its creatures. It is an example of exasperated self-consciousness, of town-mad art. For all its cleverness, it is too merely of the head to be tolerable. It has watched men and women pursuing one another in a clique entirely surrounded by mirrors, but it has taken the postures in the mirrors too seriously. It has committed the offense of failing to imagine itself inside the other fellow's flesh and blood.

F. H.

What Is History?

The Processes of History, by F. J. Teggart. New Haven: Yale University Press. $1.25.

IN the evolution of every branch of scientific study there comes a time when it is important to take stock of fundamental notions. In the case of history and politics there is today a peculiar significance in such analysis. The progress in methodology during the last twenty-five years has been so immense that the student too rarely realizes the meaning of the tools of which he makes use, or beyond that meaning the kind of philosophy those tools imply. In the single sphere of history, for example, no man can now hope adequately to write the history either of institutions or of the particular men who worked them unless he is acquainted at least with the general bearings of law and philosophy, of psychology and of economics. So, at least in the perspective of the ideal, does the unity of knowledge take revenge upon our craving for specialization. We are dealing with a process that is continuous; and the more profoundly the student digs into his material the more clearly he will perceive that, to take a single example, American federalism really takes its rise in the Conciliar Movement of the fifteenth century, that to understand the ideas of Nicholas of Cusa, of Gerson and of Cesarini he must examine the foundations of the Christian Church.

It is the great merit of Professor Teggart's most interesting little volume that it raises this question in what is perhaps its most valuable form. It assumes that history is scientific in the sense that biology and physics are scientific and asks what, if we use the methodology of the sciences, is the kind of result that can be expected from this procedure. The value of this approach lies in the fact that a utilitarian age wants results from its investigations; it will admit that scholarship per se is worth while, but it is not so supremely anxious for its endowment as for the establishment of chairs in Spanish and Russian from which commercial results may be expected. If Mark Pattison likes to devote ten years to the life of Casaubon the age will not complain; but it gives its money to the man who attempts synthetic rubber. Professor Teggart, I think, is absolutely sound in his contention that there is far more practical and immediate meaning in historical work than is usually understood. We too little realize that we are, after all, survivals of an endless series of generations, that our nature is determined by the environment they made. The historic method, in its fullest sense, seems the only hypothesis of investigation that is justified by the facts that we encounter. For the present is so much the mere completion of the past that politics, as Seeley said, are in fact vulgar unless they are liberalized by history. It is this which explains, for instance, why the English parliamentary system has been so different in its development when transplanted to other lands. It is this which explains, also, the difference between English trade-unionism with its massive, permanent organization and its immense financial structure, with the mobile and skeletal character of trade-unionism in France. Our world, do what we will, is a pluralistic world and it is pluralistic because it exists in time and space.

We talk of a science of history; but it is well that we should remember, as I think Professor Teggart too little emphasizes, the character of our material. The human equation is so final in the business we have in hand that scientific history can never, I take it, have the finality that attaches to physical or biological enquiry. It is bound, so much more, to be temperamental; Mommsen will judge the fall of Greece with the eyes of a German who believes in imperial unity and Freeman will attack his judgment exactly upon the antithetic basis of one who believes with passion in the rights of small nations. And Mommsen's theory of Roman development can no more help being determined by the particular facts of his own time than a Roman Catholic can help judging the problems of theological exegesis differently from the Protestant. In history, that is to say, a system of psychological values impedes the general flavor of our judgments in a way that does not occur when we solve differential equations. The capacity for demonstration is different; truth in history is of necessity more relative than truth in mathematics.

Professor Teggart states the general problem in terms somewhat more narrow than I like. "The problem before us," he says, "is to find out how man has come to be as he is everywhere throughout the world today." But that, surely, is only part of the enquiry; we want to know the line of development, but we want also to know the present results. To take a concrete example, I should regard Mr. Graham Wallas's Human Nature in Politics as, in the best sense, a work of history. It sums up a series of speculations upon which any adequate account of political evolution must be founded. There is, of course, a sense in which the historian will, as Professor Teggart says, take man as "given"; but I do not think it can usefully be the sense in which Mr. Wallas bases his theories. For, in some sort, all the best of historical writing is founded in metaphysical assumptions, on those intuitions, as Mr. Justice Holmes describes them, which, even if they are less articulate than the solemn major premiss, are none the less subtle for that. One has only to compare Ranke and Gardiner, or Ranke and Macaulay, to see the play of those intuitions. So that the real answer to the question, what is history ? is, in very real fashion, the character and environment of the historian. There is no one real method of approach which rules out all others. You cannot write the history of English local government in the same way that you would discuss the origins of episcopacy; the chance, in fact, is that by no manner of means could you get the same man interested in both problems, with the result that the surrounding hypothesis is radically distinct. Every history must be a selection of facts and the things you are will determine the character of your selection.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That, as I believe, is the importance of men like Mr. Wallas to Professor Teggart's enquiry. They give you a description of the environment in which the books of our age are written; and, because of that, they constitute the implicit preface to every volume.

I personally feel so grateful to Professor Teggart for his book that there are several suggestions I would make bold to offer. As it stands it suffers somewhat, I think, from over-compression. It makes continual reference to enquiries that are not within the scope of the ordinary reader. There is a story of a great French professor whose pupils complained of his examination paper. They took it to a colleague who urged that he could himself answer but two of the questions. "I can myself answer one," was the reply. In the next edition of this book, I hope greatly that Professor Teggart will have simple people like myself in mind. I hope, too, that he will enlarge that part of his work which deals with the influence of historical writing. We know what men like Lamartine have done with their lies; it would be valuable to have some estimate of what greater men have done with their truths.

H. J. L.

Sharing the Surplus

Profit Sharing, Its Principles and Practice, a collaboration by Arthur W. Burritt, Henry S. Dennison, Edwin F. Gay, Ralph E. Heilman, Henry P. Kendall. New York: Harper & Brothers. $2.50.

A BOOK on profit sharing which emanates from five men with the admirable qualifications of the present collaborators is an achievement in American business literature. It marks progress not merely because it reveals the man of affairs in the new role of critical student but happily enough as philosopher. The younger generation of executives here indicates its capacity for objective, dispassionate and broadminded reflection upon the problems closest to it. Because the emphasis is wisely placed upon discussion of underlying principles the book rises above the dull level of a manual and clears the air authoritatively as respects the limits and values of profit-sharing projects. Supplemented by the more statistical and intentionally colorless government document recently published on the same subject, this work supplies the data and the philosophizing upon this subject for which American employers are unquestionably clamoring.

Judging from the evidence of these two volumes the bewildered employer should clamor no longer. Everything points to the conclusion that profit sharing is successfully applied only under definitely restricted circumstances. That it has little utility for the general run of American factories with from two hundred to two thousand employees, is clearly implied. So far as the great bulk of large scale industrial enterprises are concerned, profit sharing appears to offer little or no practical suggestion upon the fundamental question of "division of the product." If it had no other value this study would be worth while simply because it establishes this point on the authority of men who ought to know. The air is now clear for further fundamental proposals regarding the distribution of the earnings of industry. What part trade unions should play in a more equitable division of corporation income; what methods of public control over profits should be adopted—these are questions provoked by a consideration of the limits of profit sharing, questions which will still confront the younger generation of executives for candid and liberal answer.

But one question must be answered at a time. And the answer which this collaboration offers to the question, What are the principles of sound profit sharing, is satisfactory at almost every point. The authors stress the need of a defined purpose behind the institution of profit sharing.

"Many an unsuccessful concern is casting about for some device which will make its business prosperous. Profit sharing alone cannot work this transformation. A management unable to deal with the problems which it already confronts will only add to its troubles by undertaking to grapple with a new problem."

They know that a careful analysis of the problems of many corporations would indicate a need for reforms and improvements in more elementary directions than profit sharing. It is idle to suppose that workers can be stimulated to new records of performance and profit, if working conditions are unwholesome and unattractive, if no training is given, if foremen tyrannize over men, if long hours of work are imposed. Yet it is in the face of precisely this sort of muddle that manufacturers are today turning to industrial advisers with the injunction to "fix me up a profit sharing scheme. I've got to stop all this discontent."

If, therefore, a desire to minimize discontent is one motive, there are certain established rules to follow if a concern is determined to go to the length of adopting a division of profits. Wages must at least equal those of the locality. The profits should be divided at moderately frequent intervals, on a basis understood by the participants. No conditions should surround the scheme which "in any

TIFFANY & CO.
JEWELERS SILVERSMITHS STATIONERS
THE MAIL SERVICE
GIVES PROMPT ATTENTION
TO ALL INQUIRIES
FIFTH AVENUE AND 37TH STREET
NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way tend to limit or lessen the liberty of individual or group action." "The bargaining power of labor is materially increased when the employees may freely leave, either as *individuals* or in a group. . . . Employees are justified in scrutinizing carefully all plans which have for their chief purpose promoting length of service. . . . A premium upon length of service should not be used to penalize employees for going out on strike or to curtail their efforts to improve their conditions of employment. Otherwise the employees might lose more than they gain."

Of special importance is the adoption of a definite contract or agreement that publishes in advance the amount of profit to be shared and the method of its determination. The fact that the amount of the share to be distributed is not specified at the outset, that the method of computing the share is unnecessarily complex and that employees are allowed no check upon the financial practices of the firm, accounts largely for dissatisfaction with many existing schemes.

But the motive of allaying discontent is not, according to this study, one of the better reasons for introducing profit sharing. A desire to increase efficiency or profits is a more prevalent reason. Yet the investigation notes many limitations upon the value of profit sharing even in these directions. It specifies that on the whole profit sharing works most effectively in small enterprises, that it has major value in stimulating effort where individual exertion and results are hard to measure, and where supervision of work is difficult; and that those in managerial positions are most susceptible to the inducements of profit sharing as it has usually been administered. "Regarded purely as an efficiency method, as a business arrangement for increasing profits by sharing them, the effectiveness of general profit sharing is in direct relation to the rank of the participators, and in inverse relation to the size of the concern or of the participating group."

The study is rightly discriminating in the modesty of its claims for profit sharing.

"While we are confident that proper profit sharing will accomplish some very important results, there are certain things which profit sharing does *not* do. Profit sharing is not a substitute for good management, nor should it be introduced with the expectation that it alone will transform an unsuccessful and poorly managed business into a highly successful and prosperous one."

"Neither will profit sharing make up for the lack of personality in management, nor will it give the participants such interest and zeal in the success of the concern as to make the business self-operative. . . . Personality is an important factor in making profit sharing operate successfully. A well designed plan will fail to produce desirable results if administered by persons unable to command the confidence of employees or to stimulate their interest."

The one point at which the critique could have been stronger relates to the administration of profit sharing. While emphasizing the administrative provisions and guaranties necessary to secure the employees' confidence, the authors ignore a primary and obviously logical proposal. They fail to say that the only way to assure in employees an attitude of complete confidence in the scheme is to admit them to a share in its administration.

There are indications here and there in their own data that the value of this joint control has been demonstrated; and this is a truth which certainly is in line with successful experience in other administrative problems such as safety, suggestions, grievances and the like, where employees' cooperation in control is proving valuable.

The familiar objections of organized labor to profit sharing are met in a friendly and outspoken manner. Criticism from this quarter is in reality largely disarmed by the following admission:

"The profit sharing here advocated recognizes the wisdom of maintaining the basic standards of wages and conditions of employment. The forces which determine these standards, including, where necessary, the collective bargain and the strike, would have free play, and wise profit sharing will not attempt to interfere with their legitimate operation. Moreover, granting for the sake of argument that profit sharing and the organization of labor were essentially antagonistic to each other, organized labor as a movement would have little to fear from profit sharing, for it is best applied to (managerial) groups in which organization is not significant."

In other words, the much flaunted claims of those who saw in profit sharing a method of reconciling the interests of capital and labor fade away like mist before this scientific study by a group of enlightened employers. The service they have rendered ramifies in several directions. But of principal value is their demonstration that the interests of manual workers, in so far as they are opposed to those of managers or investors, are not best advanced by the gratuitous concessions of large corporations. Governed as so much of American opinion is by a desire for "cooperation" in industry, it is wholesome to have the employers themselves establish the fact that cooperation—whatever that may mean—is not secured by profit sharing. The real way to secure cooperation—but that is the proper subject for a further study by executives like these who have open minds and the courage of their convictions.

O. T.

Recent Publications

What Men Live By, by Leo Tolstoi. Translated by L. and A. Maude. Stratford Universal Library Series. Boston: The Stratford Co. Twenty-five cents.

TO say that these stories were not a fair sample of Tolstoi would be to overlook one of his many sides and what he would probably have called the chief concern of his existence. Yet beside Anna Kerenina, The Cossacks, War and Peace, such simply moral fables seem but apocryphal. Reduced to their lowest terms, these four tales are exhortations to be good addressed to those least likely to know why or how they should be so. Very likely their simple Christianity was aimed at his own peasants of Yasnaya Polyana. Perhaps he never meant their art and freshness also to please the sophisticated. But certainly we can find in them not a few of the qualities we love him best for, a rarely sensitive ear for truth half-heard, keen human analysis, an idealism sane yet making for things infinitely far. He can give frailty to mortals, divinity to angels, and quicken both with his particular calm radiance of reality.

Bohemian (Čech) Bibliography, a list of English books relating to Bohemia, by Thomas Čapek and Anna Vostrovský Čapek. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. $1.00.

BOHEMIA has advanced in the minds of most of us—since the war and almost entirely because of it—to as secure a place on our maps of an old, mismanaged world

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as in our hopes for a new and better one. Her uncompromising people are the centre of Slav revolt in Austria, the surest menace to Germanism within Mitteleuropa. We owe her independence not only because Austria has executed forty thousand of her civilians of both sexes. She stands on the record of her own past, fully equipped for independence, better educated than any other part of Austria-Hungary, with a highly developed industry and handicraft, with an irresistible national consciousness, and an ancient tradition of liberty and progress. Further ignorance of her on our part is inexcusable. This careful list of several hundred books, in English, on every aspect of Czech life and history, inspires admiring curiosity for Bohemian character, teaches a deep respect for the men Bohemia has given to the world, from the arch-martyr and reformer, John Hus, from Komensky, divine and pedagogue, once offered the presidency of Harvard College, through Dvořak and Smetana down to Thomas Masaryk, the exiled leader of national independence. Indeed, the Capeks have done America and their own country a great service with this thorough and attractive bibliography.

The Stag's Hornbook, edited by John McClure. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $1.60.

THIS is a pocket companion for the dry days that are coming upon us, a various company of gay songs for every temper and degree of man whether an exile from Bacchus or his slave. If Sir John Suckling or "Bring us in good ale" fails to please, here is a rare choice of the songs of our own century from George Ade to the Milwaukee Sentinel. And victims of the other social and polite vices, tea, tobacco or "tempestuous petticoats," will find no unusual amusement in this cheerful anthology.

Ambulance 464, by Julien H. Bryan. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.50.

"I WENT over, as did so many of the others, with the object of seeing war at first hand and of getting some excitement, as well as of being of some service. . . . But having arrived in France and learned what the French people had gone through, we altered our point of view, and were almost ashamed." Such frankness is quite disarming, and, now gay, now serious, is the spirit of the book to the end. Only the easy adaptability, only the flexibility of youth can pass so easily from hours of bumping wounded over ruined roads to hours of poker or hunting for souvenirs, exploded or unexploded. The photographs—the most satisfactory of souvenirs—are here perhaps the best in any personal war-book we have seen, and give an uncannily sudden sense of reality. Always interesting, often fascinating, Ambulance 464 is the growth of a generous adventure into a fine and thoughtful one.

Contributors

to this Issue

H. N. BRAILSFORD—An English publicist. Author of The War of Steel and Gold; A League of Nations.

H. SIDEBOTHAM—Until recently military critic of the Manchester Guardian and editor of the Manchester Guardian's History of the War. Is now military critic of the London Times.

G. SHIBATA—A Japanese business man, and a graduate of the University of Wisconsin. Has been the representative of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce in Washington.

And H. G. WELLS.



Washing Nine Million Hands

Massive muscular hands, dainty snowy hands, tiny grimy hands—nine million all told, belong to the families that read The Delineator—nine million hands to be washed every day. How long does a cake of soap last in your family? And who buys the soap in your family?

If you make any article for this enormous market of a million progressive, prosperous families, advertise it to the women folks—they are the "purchasing agents."

The **Delineator**

The Magazine In One Million Homes

Whatever book you want

Wanamaker's

has it, or will get it.

BROADWAY AT NINTH, NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Russian Wolfhound *Identifies Borzoi Books*

ALFRED A. KNOPF—THE BORZOI

220 West Forty-second Street, New York

LAST week I spoke of rising costs and of how much concern they are today to book publishers. Another matter that will soon engross the trade will be the restrictions more or less stringent which the government will doubtless place upon us.

In a general sort of way the number of new titles a publisher may issue will probably be reduced; novels will have to contain as few pages as possible and be printed on thinner, lighter paper than now, and the sending of books on consignment to dealers for display purposes will be discontinued. All of which should benefit the publisher, who will choose from among manuscripts submitted to him much more carefully than heretofore if he knows that he can publish only so many and no more. But the paper question is most interesting.

For some reason—only the Lord himself can know it—every bookseller tells every publisher that books—especially novels—must *bulk*, i.e., be *thick*. Thus they must be printed either on so-called English feather-weight paper—which is almost impossible to get now—or on very heavy paper. And as paper is sold by the pound that means added cost and added freight tonnage.

Tonnage we all know the importance of saving, but the thin book will help us in our homes where space is also becoming frightfully expensive. Ask anyone with a library worth the name who lives in a city apartment. By using thin paper and sacrificing bulk, *two books can be put in the space now filled by one.* Furthermore, the book on thin paper will be easier to carry and lighter and more comfortable to hold open in the hand. The advantages of such a book seem so logical that I would ask every reader to consider the matter and write his opinion either to me or to his bookseller.

Alfred A. Knopf

BABSON'S SERVICE FOR MANUFACTURERS
Babson Reports accurately forecast the course of commodity quotations.
Particulars sent free. Write to Dept. N-29 of
Babson's Statistical Organization Compiling Building Wellesley Hills, Mass.
Largest Organization of its Character in the World

THE ONE WAY for you to be sure that the CYPRESS lumber you get was grown in a region near enough to the coast to possess the MAXIMUM *of decay-resisting quality* is to refuse all but genuine "TIDE-WATER" CYPRESS—and the **only way** to *KNOW* that you're getting *Tide-water* Cypress is to *insist* (and *keep on insisting*) upon SEEING WITH YOUR OWN EYES the REGISTERED TRADE-MARK of the Southern Cypress Manufacturers' Association. Tell your lumberman.

Look for this mark on every board or bundle. It's your quality insurance.

43 Free vols. in the Cypress Pocket Library. Why not get some?

SOUTHERN CYPRESS MFRS.' ASS'N.
WHICH IS NEAREST? 255 Hibernia Bank Building, New Orleans, La. / 1255 Heard Nat'l Bank Building, Jacksonville, Fla.

Buy W.S.S. War Saving Stamps



For Hay Fever and Summer Colds

Luden's give real comfort to nose and throat. Many uses. Popular with soldiers on dusty hikes and drills. Luden's allay thirst and refresh the mouth. You use Luden's in winter—try them in summer, too.

LUDENS MENTHOL COUGH DROPS



Give Quick Relief as usual 5¢

RED GUM "AMERICA'S FINEST CABINET WOOD" RED GUM

ENDURING HARDWOOD, SOFT AS SATIN, NATURAL TONE A RICH, WARM BROWN. "A JOY TO THE EYE."

EUROPE USED OUR RED GUM FOR FINE CABINET WORK YEARS BEFORE AMERICA AWOKE TO ITS OWN.

Enjoy Beauty? Write for Samples. *Wish Knowledge? Write for Booklet.*

RED GUM DIV., AMERICAN HARDWOOD MFRS. ASS'N. 1322 Bank of Commerce Bldg MEMPHIS, TENN.

HOTEL PURITAN
Boston

390 Commonwealth Avenue, near Massachusetts Ave. subway station, which is 4 minutes from shops and theatres, 8 from South and 11 from North Stations.

The atmosphere of this Distinctive Boston House is unique. Globe-trotters call it one of the most home-like and attractive hotels in the world.

All your inquiries gladly answered.

N. R. COSTELLO, *Manager*

PALESTINE AND THE WAR

A series of authoritative lectures at the Jewish Centre, 131 W. 86th St. July 15th to July 19th, 2-5 P. M.

Registration fee for the course . . . one dollar

Intercollegiate Zionist Association
44 E. 23rd Street, New York City

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED